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ELIMINATING THE CAPITAL GAINS
PREFERENCE. PART II: THE
PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAXATION*
MICHAEL J. WAGGONER* 0
Although many different policies are reflected in regard to cor-
porate taxation, two principal policies of the present tax system are
evident. First, ordinary income is differentiated from capital gains.
Second, the stockholder is distinguished from the corporation as a
taxable entity. Both of these policies must be vigorously pursued if
two separate systems of taxation-one for capital gains and another
for ordinary income-are to be maintained. The present system,
however, is inequitable and complex. Much of the complexity and
many of the inequities could be eliminated by reforming the system.
In particular, the preferential treatment of capital gains should be
eliminated. To the extent that the separation of the stockholder and
the corporation is premised on the distinction between ordinary income
and capital gains, that separation should fall with the demise of
capital gains.1
Preferential treatment of capital gains under the present system
results in substantial revenue loss to the government. It provides a
"loophole" substantially and disproportionately benefitting high income
persons. Moreover, it is a major source of complexity in the tax sys-
tem. The capital gains preference has been justified as a remedy for
a variety of problems such as inflation, bunching, lock-in, and double
*This is the second of two parts of this article. For the first part, see
Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital Gains Preference. Part I: The Problems of
Inflation, Bunching, and Lock-In, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 313 (1977).
"Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. A.B.,
(1964) Stanford University; LL.B., (1967) Harvard University.
1. For other discussions of integrating the personal and corporate income
taxes see Break, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes, 22 NAT.
TAX. J. 39 (1969); Hall, Integrating Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, in
FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMhIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 682 (Joint Econ.
Comm., Tax Policy Subcomm. 1955); McClure, Integration of the Personal and
Corporate Income Taxes, 88 HARV. L. REv. 532 (1975); Symposium, The Taxation
of Income from Corporate Shareholding, 28 NAT. TAX J. 255 (1975).
In a series of thoughtful articles Professor Blum proposed substantial revi-
sions in corporate taxation short of integrating the personal and corporate income
taxes. See Blum, Corporate Acquisitions Under the Income Tax: Another Ap-
proach, 50 TAXES 85 (1972); Blum, Taxing Transfers of Incorporated Businesses:
A Proposal for Improvement, 52 TAXES 516 (1974); Blum, The Earnings & Profits
Limitation on Dividend Income: A Reappraisal, 53 TAXES 68 (1975); Blum,
Taxing the Corporate Shareholder-Some Old Problems Reconsidered, 53 TAXES
217 (1975); Blum, Drawing the Line Between Dividends and Investment Ad-
justments: A Proposal for More Consistency, 55 TAXES 30 (1977).
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taxation of corporate earnings. Preferential treatment of capital gains,
however, fails to respond adequately to these problems. Sometimes
it provides too little relief, other times too much. If the tax laws
presented a system of mechanisms more finely tuned to afford relief
from these problems, the capital gains preference could be eliminated.
Part I of this article analyzed the present treatment of capital
gains and the resulting problems.2 The article proposed mechanisms
to relieve the problems of inflation, bunching, and lock-in. 3 Part II
provides an analysis of a number of different proposals designed to
end the double taxation of corporate earnings. The first section out-
lines the complex mechanics of the present system of taxing corpora-
tions and shareholders, then discusses the adverse effects of that sys-
tem. The next three sections discuss three alternative solutions to the
problem of the double taxation of corporate earnings.
One solution to this problem would be partial integration. Under
partial integration, dividends would be taxed only once but retained
earnings would still be doubly taxed. Under one version of partial
integration, the corporation would be allowed a deduction for divi-
dends paid. Under the other version, the shareholder would be
allowed a credit for taxes paid by the corporation on dividends he
received. Although partial integration could be fairly easily imple-
mented, it should be rejected because it would not solve the problem
of double taxation of retained earnings and therefore would probably
require retention of many of the complexities of the present system.
An alternative solution would tax shareholders on the ,benefits of
stock ownership-stock appreciation (whether realized or not) and
dividends-and repeal the corporate income tax. Although corporate
earnings would no longer be doubly taxed, problems would arise in
applying dividend and appreciation taxation to closely held corpora-
tions. Moreover, unless unrealized appreciation were generally rec-
ognized for tax purposes, 4 taxing unrealized appreciation in regularly
traded stock could distort investment decisions. Accordingly, this
solution is not viable.
The recommended solution is full integration of the personal and
corporate income taxes. Under full integration, the corporate income
tax would be eliminated. Corporate earnings, whether or not dis-
tributed, would be currently taxed to shareholders. The shareholder's
basis of his stock would be increased as the corporation accumulated
2. Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital Gains Preference. Part I: The Prob-
lems of Inflation, Bunching, and Lock-In, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 313, 317-35 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Part I]. The inadequacy of the present treatment of capital
gains as a solution to the problem of double taxation of corporate earnings is
discussed in id. at 325-28.'
3.* See Part I, supra note 2, at 335-62, 362-66, 366-97 respectively.
4. See id. at 375-86.
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earnings and reduced as those earnings were distributed.5 Although
full integration would involve substantial administrative complexities,
those social costs would be less than the social costs of the inequity,
inefficiency and complexity of the present system of taxing corpora-
tions and shareholders.
TiE Cuamrr SYsTEM
Its Operation
The present system of taxing corporations and shareholders is
very intricate and therefore not widely understood. Because this
article is intended for those unfamiliar with tax, as well as specialists,
the basic system of taxing corporations and shareholders and its
inconsistencies will be discussed first. The discussion will then turn to
the complicated system created by taxpayers' attempts to exploit these
inconsistencies and the government's response.
A corporation is a taxable entity.6 It computes its taxable income
much as an individual would, adding together all of its items of gross
income and then subtracting various allowable deductions.7 Thus a
corporation's gross income might include gain on sales of some of its
productive assets or investment property, the excess of gross receipts
from sales of inventory property over the cost of goods sold, payment
received for services, receipts of rent or interest, etc.; deductions might
include losses on sales of property, depreciation, payment of rent or
salary or interest, etc. Dividends paid to shareholders, however, are
not deductible by the corporation in computing its taxable income,8
5. Dividends would be taxable after the shareholder's basis in his stock
had been recovered.
6. This discussion will focus on normal business corporations. Corporations
of certain types such as banks, savings and loan companies, insurance companies,
mutual funds, etc. are subject to special rules. See generally Clark, Federal In-
come Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603 (1975); B. BITTKER
& J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
§ 1.06 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EUSTICE].
7. This statement is a simplification. For example, a corporation's deduction
for charitable contributions is limited to 5% of its (modified) taxable income,
whereas for an individual the deduction is limited to 50% or 20% of his (modified)
adjusted gross income (compare I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) with I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)),
and only individuals are allowed a deduction for personal exemptions (I.R.C.
§ 151). Unless otherwise indicated, all sections referred to are from the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, Title 26 of the United States Code, and
will be cited in the form "Section XXXX." On the other hand, corporations are
treated more generously than individuals in regard to the investment tax credit
when they are lessors of property (Section 46(e)(3)), in regard to losses
(Section 165(c)), and in regard to bad debts (Section 166(d))..
8. The Internal Revenue Code does not expressly disallow, deduction of
dividends paid. Rather, the Code provides that virtually anything may be in-
cludable in gross income under Section 61 unless otherwise provide , but an item
is deductible only if authorized by some specific provision such as Section 162
(trade or business expenses) or Section 212 (expenses of investments). No
provision generally authorizes a deduction for dividends paid by a corporation.
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in contrast to interest payments which are deductible. 9 Thus the
amounts from which a corporation pays dividends have already been
subjected to the federal income tax at the corporate level.10
A shareholder is not taxed on undistributed corporate earnings
or changes in the value of stock he continues to hold." The share-
holder will be taxed only when the corporation pays dividends or
when he sells or otherwise disposes of his stock. Dividends paid in
cash or other property 12 will usually be taxed to the shareholder at
ordinary income rates if the corporation has "earnings and profits" 13
for either the current year or past years. The shareholder will nor-
mally be taxed on stock sales at capital gains rates-half that of
ordinary income-if the amount realized exceeds his adjusted basis. 14
Similarly, amounts received on liquidation of a corporation will be
treated as though received as payment in exchange for the stock,
at capital gains rates.' 5
Normally, then, corporate earnings are taxed once at the corporate
level and again as ordinary income at the shareholder level, but the
plan contains inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are apparent in
the treatment of earnings and profits as well as distributions of ap-
preciated property. If a corporation has undistributed earnings, the
shareholder may not be taxed at ordinary income rates. If a share-
holder sells his stock before the earnings and profits are distributed,
he may be taxed at capital gains rates to the extent those earnings
and profits have increased the price of the stock. The purchaser of
the stock, however, will be taxed on a dividend of those earnings and
profits at ordinary income rates even though the corporation had no
9. Section 163.
10. Income tax rates are generally lower for corporations than for individuals.
For corporations the rate is 20% on the first $25,000 of taxable income, 22% on
the next $25,000, and 48% on the remainder. Section 11. For individuals filing
a joint return, the rates are 0% to 32% on the first $25,000, 32% to 50% on the next
$25,000, and 50% to 70% on the remainder. Section 1(a). Section 1348 limits
the maximum rate on personal services taxable income to 50%.
11. Section 61(3) requires inclusion in income of "gains derived from dealings
in property," and Section 1001 requires recognition of gain only if there has
been a "sale or exchange," or a "sale or other disposition." Thus by negative
inference, unrealized gains are not recognized for tax purposes. Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), held that unrealized gains and undistributed
corporate earnings are not "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amend-
ment. Although as indicated in Part I, supra note 2, at 375-78, that decision's
constitutional basis seems to have been eroded, it is still a valid statement of a
principle generally followed under the present federal income tax.
12. A corporation's distribution of shares of its own stock normally is not
taxable to the shareholders. Section 305.
13. Sections 301(c)(1), 316(a). The determination of "earnings and profits"
is a complex matter beyond the scope of this article. See generally BiTrrKEn &
EUSTICE, supra note 6, at § 7.03. For present purposes, "earnings and profits"
may be considered to be after-tax corporate earnings, reduced by prior dividends.
14. Sections 1221, 1223, 1202. The mechanics of present taxation of capital
gains and losses are discussed in Part I, supra note 2, at 317-18, 328-31.
15. Section 331.
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earnings and profits while he held the stock.16 If the corporation is
liquidated, no one will be taxed at ordinary income rates for those
earnings and profits.' 7 The system is also inconsistent at the corporate
level. For instance, a corporation is not taxed on the amount of
appreciation for property distributed as a dividend or upon liquida-
tion.1 8 Thus, the present system offers some relief from the harshness
of double taxation but does so on a sporadic and inefficient basis.
Taxpayers have been ingenious in devising their own means of
relief from the effects of double taxation. As a result, a very complex
body of law has developed to resist these attempts to exploit various
aspects of the system of taxing corporations and shareholders. This
body of law deserves further discussion because its complexity demon-
strates the necessity of reform.
One method of avoiding the double taxation of corporate earnings
is to avoid the corporate-level tax. A popular scheme has been to
disguise dividends in the form of deductible payments. A great deal
of litigation has arisen over the characterization of payments as interest
or salaries rather than dividends. Corporate payments cast as rentals,
royalties, and fees for guaranteeing corporate obligations also reflect
potential for disguising dividends. The characterization of these pay-
ments has largely been left for determination on a case-by-case basis
with relatively little guidance from legislation or tax regulations. 19
16. In contrast, only interest accrued while a taxpayer held an obligation is
taxable to him. To the extent of past accrued interest, gain to the seller will
be interest income; payment of interest accrued before a taxpayer acquired an
obligation will not be interest income but will reduce basis. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-7(c)-7(d) (1957).
An example might make this inconsistency clear. Suppose A owns a vending
machine. When the coin box is full, A sells the machine to B. A should have
income as the coins go into the box, and B should not have income when he
removes the coins that were in the box when he purchased the machine because
he is merely recovering a part of the price he paid for the machine and the coins
it contained. This is how the transaction would be taxed if the machine were
a bond. But if the machine were a share of stock, B would be taxed as the
coins were removed.
It may be that the market will compensate here. Just as the value of stock
may increase to reflect retained earnings, it may decrease to reflect the tax
consequences of receiving those earnings. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S.
156, 171-72 (1921).
17. Under Section 333, in liquidating a corporation, shareholders may elect to
be taxed on earnings and profits as a dividend and on the difference between the
value of property received and their basis in their stock as capital gain only
to the extent that money and securities received exceed each's ratable share of
earnings and profits. This election is advantageous where the corporation has
little earnings and profits but has property worth much more than its shareholders'
bases in their stock.
18. Sections 311(a), 336. Section 311(d) requires a corporation to recog-
nize gain in certain cases when it distributes appreciated property in redemption
of stock.
19. For instance, Congress in 1969 authorized the Treasury Department to
issue regulations differentiating stock from indebtedness, and thus dividends
1977]
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The lack of clear guidance in this area may result in unequal treat-
ment of taxpayers. Because of the difficulty in drawing clear lines in
this area of ambiguous payments, some degree of uncertainty may be
unavoidable as long as corporations and shareholders are treated as
separate taxable entities.20
Another method of avoiding the corporate-level tax is to dis-
tribute appreciated property. Because of Sections 311 and 336, the
corporation normally will not be taxed on the appreciation. Whether
the receipt of the appreciated property is taxed as a dividend or as a
liquidation, the sharehclder will normally have a basis in the property
equal to its fair market value when distributed. In many cases the
shareholders will immediately sell the distributed property, recognizing
little or no gain. When the distributed assets consist of one or a few
pieces of property, particularly when there are numerous shareholders,
the corporation may seek potential buyers prior to the distribution.
The corporation rather than the shareholder, however, may be treated
as if it had sold the property, resulting in additional tax at the
corporate level.2'
The uncertainty of determining the permissible level of corporate
activity under these circumstances led to the enactment of Section 337.
Under this section a corporation may avoid recognizing gain.or loss
on sales of its qualifying property after adopting a plan to liquidate
within twelve months. These sales are treated as if the property had
been distributed and then independently sold by the shareholders.
One might question whether this narrow exception to the double
taxation of corporate earnings is appropriate. Perhaps a more satis-
factory solution would be to consider a corporate distribution of ap-
preciated property as an appropriate time for the recognition of gain. 22
from interest. It was to consider factors such as whether there was an un-
conditional promise to pay at a fixed rate of interest for adequate consideration,
whether the "debt" was subordinated, the debt/equity ratio, convertibility, and
the relationship between debt and stock holdings. Section 385. Those regu-
lations have not yet been issued. For an excellent discussion of tax and
institutional issues involved in this area, see Note, Toward New Modes of Tax
Decision Making-The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and Dislocations in Tax Law-
making Responsibility, 83 HAnV. L. REv. 1695 (1970).
Section 162(a)(1) and Treas. Reg, § 1.162-7 (1958) provide general guid-
ance in determining under what circumstances "salary" payments will be de-
ductible. A case may turn on a determination that the father-employee dominated
the shareholder-son. Harolds Club v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 861 (9th Cir.
1965).
20. Others have suggested that the need for drawing a line might be reduced
by eliminating the corporate interest deduction. See, e.g., Warren, The Cor-
porate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585 (1974).
Under this approach it would, of course, still be necessary to distinguish divi-
dends from salary, rent, etc.
21. Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945),
with United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
22. Blum, Taxing Transfers of Incorporated Businesses: A Proposal for Im-
provement, 52 TAXES 516, 521-22 (1974), suggests that Section 337 be
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Through the manipulation of the two principles that a corpora-
tion does not generally recognize gain on the distribution of ap-
preciated property and that a shareholder may obtain capital gains
treatment when a corporation is liquidated, the corporate level tax
might be avoided and ordinary income converted to capital gains. For
example, a corporation might be organized for the purpose of com-
pleting a project such as the construction of an apartment building or
the production of a motion picture. Upon completion of the project,
the corporation could be liquidated, producing no tax at the corporate
level and only a capital gains tax at the shareholder level. Normally,
these corporate profits would be taxed as ordinary income at both
the corporate and shareholder level. Because of Section 341, a liquida-
tion or the sale of the stock of such a "collapsible corporation" will
usually produce ordinary income rather than capital gain. The appli-
cation of Section 341, however, is very complex (it is notorious for
containing a 600-word sentence, perhaps the longest in the Internal
Revenue Code) and does not restrict the avoidance of the corporate
level tax. Thus, Section 341 is an inadequate solution to the problem
of "collapsible corporations."
The corporation may also soften the effects of the double taxa-
tion of corporate earnings at the shareholder level by not paying
dividends. The shareholder may be taxed later at capital gains rates
or may not be taxed at all due to the step-up in basis at death under
Sections 1014 and 1023.23 This approach may be particularly attractive
when the shareholder's marginal tax rate exceeds the corporation's. A
variety of barriers, however, restrict this form of tax avoidance.
eliminated, so that the corporation would be taxed on sales of its productive
assets. The shareholder would then be given a credit to be applied against
his tax liability when the corporation is liquidated for taxes paid by the
corporation on such sales in the two prior years. •
A few problems remain under Section 337. Corporations have been per-
mitted to "straddle" the date of adoption of a Section 337 plan of liquidation
by selling property at a loss before ado tin the plan, thus recognizing the loss.
The corporation then adopts a plan andthereafter sells other property at a gain
which will not be recognized. See, e.g., City Bank of Washington v. Commissioner,
38 T.C. 713 (1962); Virginia Ice & Freezing Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
1251 (1958). Also,* when a corporation's principal asset is involuntarily con-
verted, the conversion will be treated as a sale. That sale normally will be
treated as having occurred when the involuntary conversion occurred, without
the corporation having had an opportunity to adopt a Section 337 plan. Central
Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974). Although that result
seems to be required under a literal reading of the statute, those involved in a
corporation whose principal assets are involuntarily converted, and who might
as a business matter choose to hlquidate the corporation, would seem to deserve
the benefits of the plan, too. Under Section 1033 the corporation whose principal
assets or other productive properties are involuntarily converted may elect to
avoid recognizing gain by reinvesting the proceeds in productive assets "similar
or related in service or use" or, under Section 1033(g), in "like kind" property.
23. These sections are discussed in Part I, supra note 2, at 372-74.
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Penalty taxes are a significant deterrent to accumulating corporate
earnings. Sections 531-537 may impose an accumulated earnings tax
of up to 38M% on a corporation which unreasonably accumulates its
earnings rather than distributing them.24  Sections 541-547 impose a
70% tax on undistributed personal holding company income of certain
closely-held corporations with specified kinds and amounts of income
from investments or from the performance of personal services. Ap-
plication of the accumulated earnings tax and the personal holding
company provisions is often complex; the taxes imposed are severe
and may constitute a trap for the unwary.25
Even if the penalty taxes are not imposed, there are practical and
tax barriers to converting the retained earnings to cash. A shareholder
might sell his stock to third parties. If the corporation is closely-held,
however, outsiders may be unwilling to buy stock and the shareholders
may be equally unwilling to welcome outside investors. If not for a
number of specific provisions in the tax law, shareholders might be
able to convert retained earnings to cash without resorting to dividend
payments. For instance, each shareholder might sell some of his stock
back to the corporation to obtain cash without changing control of
the corporation. Although a sale of stock normally produces capital
gains, because of Sections 302, 304 and 318, a stock redemption will
frequently be taxed as a dividend even though the sale is made
indirectly through other family members, related corporations, or
certain other entities. 26 Alternatively, the corporation might distribute
preferred stock to holders of its common stock. This is not usually
a taxable event. The holders of common stock could then sell the
preferred to outsiders, realizing capital gains, without jeopardizing
the original stockholders' control of the corporation. To improve the
market for the preferred, it could be promptly redeemable. If suc-
24. The tax has been held not to apply to publicly held corporations. Gol-
conda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974). The
decision has been criticized. See, e.g., Farkas, Golconda Mining Corporation v.
Commissioner and I.R.C. Section 531: Lucky Strike for Publicly Held Corpora-
tions, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 325 (1976).
25. Under Section 547 a corporation may declare a deficiency dividend after
the IRS or a court has finally determined it to be liable for the personal holding
company tax. This dividend will reduce the tax owed, but not interest or
penalties.
Under Section 565 a shareholder may consent to be taxed as though he
had received a dividend, thus reducing the amount subject to penalty taxes.
This relief is limited, however, because the consent must be filed not later
than the due date for the corporation's income tax return. Treas. Reg. § 1.565-
l(b) (3) (1960). At that time it may not be known whether the corporation
is subject to the penalty tax or how large a dividend would be necessary to
avoid imposition of the tax.
26. Such sales will not be treated as dividends if they satisfy the require-
ments of Section 302(b); for example, they terminate the shareholder's interest,
they are substantially disproportionate, or they are otherwise not equivalent to
a dividend. See also Section 346 which deals with partial liquidations.
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cessful,2 17 the transaction would permit cash to be obtained from the
corporation as capital gains rather than as ordinary income. Under
Section 306, however, sale of stock received in a tax-free distribution
may produce ordinary income.
Another means of extracting retained earnings from the corpora-
tion without paying ordinary income rates would be to break the
corporation in two. The control and ownership of the business could
be continued in one corporation with the surplus assets placed in the
second corporation. Stock in the second corporation could be dis-
tributed tax-free to stockholders of the original corporation. Those
stockholders could either liquidate the second corporation or sell it
to outsiders, thereby obtaining capital gains rates. The purchasers
could then liquidate the second corporation at little or no tax cost,
recognizing gain only to the extent the value of the assets exceeded
their basis in the stock. Because of Sections 355 and 356, however,
the distribution of stock in the second corporation will be taxed as a
dividend unless each corporation has been engaged in the active con-
duct of a trade or business for at least five years.28
A final scheme for obtaining capital gains rates would be to
liquidate a corporation with substantial retained earnings and then
continue the business in another form. Because of the liquidation-
reincorporation doctrine, if the business is reincarnated as a corpora-
tion, the purported liquidation will be taxed as a dividend.29
Many of the provisions discussed above, as well as others not
included in this survey, are intricate and imprecise. The complexity
imposes a variety of social costs."0  They produce a system where
corporate earnings are only sometimes doubly taxed. The result is
an inequitable and inefficient tax system.
Equity and Economics
The complexity of the present system of taxing corporations and
shareholders makes it difficult to analyze the system's effects. The
system in general provides for double taxation of corporate earnings
once at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level so that
27. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954). The redemption would not be taxed as a
dividend to the outsider, because it would terminate his interest in the corporation.
Section 302(b) (3).
28. It should be noted that these restrictions, while perhaps necessary to
prevent easy conversion of ordinary income into capital gains, make it difficult
to divide a corporation into separate entities. This encourages the concentra-
tion of control over the economy in relatively fewer corporations. Concentra-
tion is further encouraged by other provisions listed in Section 368(a)(1)
which in many cases will make it possible to combine corporations without
incurring tax liability.
29. See, e.g., Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d .874 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. See Part I, supra note 2, at 331-35.
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income from stock ownership may be more heavily taxed than other
income. But for shareholders in high tax brackets, the combination
of a corporate tax rate below the highest individual tax rate and the
tax advantages to shareholders of deferral and capital gains for
corporate earnings not currently distributed may result in relative
undertaxation of income from stock ownership. Moreover, the cor-
porate income tax may not be borne by shareholders but may instead
be shifted to others, such as the corporation's customers or suppliers,
or owners of capital other than corporate stock. To the extent the
corporate income tax is shifted, the tax burden on income from stock
ownership is reduced. Before discussing the effects of this system
of double taxation as mitigated by deferral, capital gains, and the
shifting of the corporate income tax, two premises should be disclosed
and justified. The first premise is that the corporate income tax
should be analyzed in terms of its effects on individuals, and not
simply accepted as a tax on corporations as such. The second premise
is that for tax purposes, the income of a corporation should be con-
sidered the income of its shareholders.
A tax should be analyzed in terms of the individuals who bear it.
That is, the analysis should determine who has less private wealth or
income than he otherwise would have because of the tax. The follow-
ing discussion will consider the taxation of corporations and their
shareholders in this context. The alternative, treating the corporate
income tax as an excise tax or service charge for the privileges and
benefits of operating in a corporate form, is unjustifiable." Most of
the benefits of the corporate form are conferred by state law, so these
benefits do not justify a federal tax on corporate earnings. A tax on
corporate income is a poor measure of those benefits. While the
corporate income tax is proportional to income, limited liability, the
principal benefit of the corporate form, probably is not. Rather,
limited liability would seem more important to shareholders of a
corporation with little income or even losses. It is equally doubtful
whether the corporate tax system reflects the true costs that a corpora-
tion may impose on society.8 2 A tax based on' sales, payroll, or capital
would be more appropriate than one based on income. Moreover,
these costs are imposed not only by corporations but also by other
businesses and even non-profit organizations. Finally, even if these
rationales for the corporate income tax were accepted, one would
still want to know as a matter of tax policy who bears the tax.
31. See McClure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes,
88 HAHv. L. REV. 532, 536-37 (1975).
32. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561
(1965) (for purposes of state income tax, the income of a multi-state corporation
may be allocated on the basis of either a corporation's sources of income or the
social costs which it generates).
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The premise of the following discussion, that the income of a
corporation should be considered the income of its shareholders, is
not self-evident. Corporate earnings may not produce any apparent
immediate benefit unless they are distributed. Undistributed corporate
income does not give the shareholder any additional cash. Moreover,
if the stock does not appreciate, the shareholder could not obtain the
benefit of retained earnings by mortgaging or selling his stock. Never-
theless, for tax purposes, corporate income should be treated as share-
holders' income. Because- shareholders have some indirect control
over the payment of dividends since they elect directors, it is not
unreasonable to subject shareholders to tax even when dividends are
not paid.33 If the price of the stock does not reflect retained earnings,
the shareholder may be considered to have made a bad investment of
the corporation's earnings.3 4  Thus it seems fair to treat corporate
income, even though neither distributed nor reflected in the price of
the stock, as the shareholders' income.
The effects of deferral and capital gains on double taxation can
best be understood by proceeding as if the corporate income tax were
borne solely by shareholders.
In general, promptly paid dividends will be overtaxed at all
income levels, the degree of overtaxation decreasing as the share-
holder's tax bracket increases. This pattern of taxation violates the
principles of horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity assumes
that persons with similar incomes should pay similar taxes. Yet if two
individuals have the same total income, the one receiving dividends
will be more heavily taxed. 5 Similarly, vertical equity assumes that
taxation should bear some principled relationship to income.86  Yet a
small income composed solely of dividends will be taxed at a higher
rate than a larger income not including dividends, even though gen-
33. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-(2)(a) (1971) (doctrine of constructive re-
ceipt). See, e.g., Fetzer Refrigerator Co. v. United States, 437 F.2d 577 (6th
Cir. 1971).
34. If the shareholder had received those earnings and invested them, he
would not be entitled to a deduction for the decline in value of his investment
until that decline was realized. This assumes that the tax system will continue
not to recognize unrealized appreciation, contrary to the suggestion in Part I,
supra note 2, at 375-86.
35. See, e.g., Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 316-17 (1972). When this article refers to income as being
undertaxed or overtaxed, it is not making a statement about desired general
levels of taxation, but it is only comparing the tax treatment of two types of
income.
36. Taxes may be regressive (taking a larger percentage of low incomes),
proportional, or progressive (taking a larger percentage of high incomes). The
present system of corporate and shareholder tax, compared to the tax on non-
corporate incomes, is not consistent with any of these approaches. The federal
income tax uses a progressive rate structure. The value judgment in favor of
progression is accepted for the purposes of this article. It should be remembered
that the federal income tax is much less progressive in practice than in theory.
See Part I, supra note 2, at 314, 315 n.2.
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erally tax rates rise with income. Moreover, the overtaxation of
corporate earnings discourages ownership of corporate stock.
The pattern becomes more complex if all the corporation's after
tax earnings are not immediately distributed. Because of deferral and
the capital gains preference, shareholders in low tax brackets are still
overtaxed but to a lesser extent. Shareholders in higher tax brackets,
however, are undertaxed 7  Thus, the principles of horizontal and
vertical equity are violated. Although stock ownership is still dis-
couraged for most persons, it is encouraged for high income persons.
Thus the present pattern of taxing corporations and their shareholders
may tend to concentrate ownership of stock among the wealthy.
Determining the effects of the present tax system is further com-
plicated because the corporate income tax may be shifted from share-
holders to others.88  Those who own or manage corporations may
view the corporate income tax as another cost to be recovered. Thus,
the tax may be shifted forward to consumers. A corporation's ability
to pass on this tax may be significant because its competitors face a
similar tax.39 If the tax is shifted forward, it in effect becomes a
regressive national sales tax. The ultimate price increase paid by
37. Assume a corporation earns $100 and pays $48 in tax. The table shows
the additional effective tax (in parentheses) and the total tax for shareholders
in the 20%, 50% and 70% tax brackets if the shareholder immediately or after a
delay receives a dividend or realizes a capital gain equal to the corporation's
after-tax income.
Shareholder Immediate Delayed
Tax Bracket Dividend Capital Gain Dividend Capital Gain
20% (10.4) 58.4 (5.2) 53.2 (5.2) 53.2 (2.6) 50.6
50% (26) 74 (13) 61 (13) 61 (6.5) 54.5
70% (36.4) 84.4 (18.2) 66.2 (18.2) 66.2 (9.1) 57.1
In the "delayed" columns, it is assumed that the shareholder obtains imme-
diate benefit from the retained earnings because they may be invested by the
corporation to produce additional earnings. The effective burden of the tax is
reduced, however, because payment is delayed. In the table, the delay is such
that an amount invested with the interest compounded would double or, put
another way, the tax is in effect halved. For example, at a compound interest
rate of 9% an amount invested will double in eight years. See Part I, supra
note 2, at 326-27.
If the shareholder's basis is stepped-up by Sections 1014 or 1023, the capital
gains tax will be eliminated but the dividend tax will not be changed.
38. For studies of shifting see Part I, supra note 2, at 327 n.22.
39. One may generalize that in our society most economic activity takes
place through corporations whose taxable income exceeds $50,000, so that each
has a marginal tax rate of 48%. Passing on the tax would be more difficult if
competitors had different marginal tax rates. See Hamovitch, Sales Taxation:
An Analysis of the Effects of Rate Increases in Two Contrasting Cases, 19 NAT.
TAX. J. 411, 417 (1966) (1% increase in sales tax caused 6% loss in sales when
surrounding jurisdictions had no sales tax but no loss of sales when surrounding
jurisdictions had sales taxes). The parallel between sales and income taxes is
imperfect. While competitors will face the same sales tax, income tax liability per
product sold will vary with profit margin.
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consumers may exceed the tax paid by the corporation because of
pyramiding. That is, normally a product passes through several
stages with a mark-up applied to each stage. Thus a tax imposed
early in the process may have been multiplied by several markups
before the product reaches the ultimate consumer. 40
The tax may be shifted backward if the corporation attempts to
recover the cost of the corporate income tax by reducing the prices
it pays to its suppliers. To the extent the costs reduced are wages
of employees of either the corporation or its suppliers, the corporate
income tax becomes another regressive employment tax.
The tax may also be shifted horizontally to capital other than
corporate stock, such as corporate or government debt, sole proprietor-
ships or partnerships. In a tax-free world corporate stock and other
capital would probably have similar rates of return after allowing for
risk and liquidity. Imposing a corporate income tax will decrease the
expected return on corporate stock relative to the expected return from
other capital.41  This corporate income tax, however, will not be
borne wholly by shareholders. Initially, invested capital would shift
from corporate stock to other capital. As the demand for other capital
increased, its rate of return would fall, while the rate of return for
corporate stock would increase. Eventually a new equilibrium would
be reached where the after-tax rate of return on corporate stock would
equal the rate of return on other capital. This new rate of return
would be lower than that in a tax-free world. Thus, ultimately, the
corporate income tax would be borne by owners of all capital.42
The extent to which the corporate income tax is shifted is unclear.
Forward and backward shifting may be restricted by competitive pres-
sures and elasticities of supply and demand. Any shifting- that does
occur may be pyramided as a product is marked up at successive
stages of the production and distribution process. Horizontal shifting
occurs only to the extent that income from corporate stock is overtaxed.
40. See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx POLICY 142, 152 (1966).
41. This statement applies to the extent the corporate income tax is not
shifted forward or backward.
42. For example, if rates of return on corporate stock and other capital were
initially 12%, imposing a 50% corporate income tax would reduce the rate of
return on corporate stock to 6%. As investment shifted from corporate stock
to other capital, the pre-tax return on stock would increase and would decrease
on other capital. A new equilibrium might be an 18% return on corporate stock,
halved to 9% by the corporate income tax, and a 9% return 'on other capital.
Although the corporation would be paying a tax of 50%, in this hypothetical its
after-tax rate of return would be only 25% lower than in a tax-free world.
Thus only half the tax would be borne by the shareholders, the remainder
being shifted horizontally to owners of other capital. - Although the owners of
other capital do not have any direct liability for the corporate income tax, they
nonetheless would bear a portion of that tax, because their return on investment
would be reduced to 9%; from the 12% they earned before there was a corporate
income tax.
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Overtaxation may not exist because the corporate income tax may
be shifted forward or backward and the shareholder may benefit from
tax advantages such as deferral and the capital gains. Also other
investments may have particular tax benefits or burdens. 43
Because the degree of shifting is not known, the effects of differ-
ent assumptions regarding shifting on taxpayer equity and the eco-
nomy must be considered. If the tax is not shifted, immediately dis-
tributed corporate earnings will be overtaxed at all shareholder tax
brackets. The overtaxation of immediately distributed corporate earn-
ings would be eliminated only if all of the corporate income tax were
shifted. As more of the tax is shifted the corporation which retains
earnings potentially becomes a tax shelter for shareholders at lower
and lower tax brackets because of deferral and capital gains. In addi-
tion, the market response may increase or decrease any resulting tax
advantage. 4
The present system adversely effects the economy. Whether or
not the tax is shifted, dividend payments are likely to be reduced
because corporate managers may seek to obtain the benefits of de-
ferral and capital gains. Stock ownership, compared to other invest-
ments, is likely to be more attractive to those in high tax brackets than
to those in lower tax brackets, further accentuating the concentration
of stock ownership among the wealthy. Forward or backward shifting
reduces the disincentive for stock ownership, but at a cost of imposing
a regressive sales or wage tax. Horizontal'shifting tends to discourage
investment reducing the productivity of our economy. The complex-
ity of the present system and its likely undesirable results make it
appropriate to consider alternative systems of taxing corporations and
shareholders.
If the problem of corporate taxation were merely one of double
taxation, the problem could be solved by eliminating one of the taxes:
repeal the corporate income tax or exclude dividends from an indi-
vidual's taxable income. These simple solutions, however, would not
solve other problems in the current system and might aggravate
them.
43. For example, it has been suggested that real estate investments would
not need present tax subsidies, such as accelerated depreciation, if tax subsidies
for rival investments, such as the oil depletion allowance and the investment tax
credit, were eliminated. GENERAL TAX REFORM: PANEL DIsCUSSIONs BEFORE
THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 602 (1973) (statement
of Jerome Kurtz).
44. For example, high income persons may have bid up the price of stock
in order to obtain tax shelter benefits. Alternatively, it may be that the demand
for equity investment by corporate managers is great enough that the high
income individuals do not clear the market. The price of stock drops, reflecting
the adverse tax consequences of stock ownership for lower income investors.
Thus, if lower income persons affect the market, the advantages of stock owner-
ship to those in higher brackets would increase.
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If the solution were limited to repealing the corporate income
tax, currently distributed corporate earnings would be taxed like other
income with no problems of vertical or horizontal equity. Retained
earnings, however, would be exempt from tax until distributed, accen-
tuating the problems of deferral and converting ordinary income into
capital gains.45 Retained earnings would be undertaxed at all taxable
income levels, with the degree of undertaxation increasing as share-
holders' marginal tax brackets increased.46 These tax effects on share-
holders would discourage corporations from paying dividends.4  "
If the solution were limited to excluding dividends from the per-
sonal income tax, problems of vertical and horizontal equity would
remain. If the corporate income tax were not shifted, all shareholders
would be taxed at 48%, overtaxing those in lower brackets and under-
taxing those in higher brackets. To the extent the corporate income
tax was shifted, the point of undertaxation would be lowered.. More-
over, with dividends tax-free but realized gains taxed, the pressure
on corporations to distribute all earnings would increase, thus reducing
retained corporate earnings, a major source of capital formation in
this country. Thus neither eliminating the corporate income tax nor
exempting dividends from tax would be sufficient to solve the prob-
lems posed by the present system of taxing corporations and share-
holders. The next three sections discuss more sophisticated solutions.
PARIAL INTEGRATION
Partial integration would require only a relatively minor and
easily implemented change in our present system. The corporate and
personal income taxes would be integrated as to dividends but not as
to retained earnings. Under one form of partial integration, the only
change from the present system would be that corporations would be
allowed a deduction for dividends paid. Under the other form, the
shareholder would be allowed a credit against his own tax liability
for taxes paid by the corporation on the amounts distributed as div-
idends.
45. See note 37 supra.
46. To the extent that retained earnings cause the stock price to increase,
those selling their stock at the end of the year would be taxed at approximately
half their normal rates due to capital gains, a tax cut of 7% for those' in the
bottom bracket and 35% for those in the top bracket (45% if the 25% Section
1201 alternative tax were used). If the stock were held for 9 years and the
interest rate were 8%, taxes would again effectively be halved, cutting taxes an
additional 34% in the bottom bracket and 174 in the top bracket (12%% if the
alternative tax were used). If the stock were not sold before the shareholder's
death, appreciation in the stock attributable to pre-1977 earnings would not
be taxed at all, cutting taxes an additional 33A in the bottom bracket and 174%
in the top bracket (124% if the alternative tax were used). See note 37 supra.
Each of the reductions--conversion, deferral, step-up in basis-is more valuable
to those in high tax brackets.
47. See text accompanying notes 107-11 infra.
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Corporate Dividend Deduction
With a corporate dividend deduction, dividends paid would be
subtracted from the corporation's gross income much like other deduc-
tions. A dividend deduction would result in dividends being taxed
only at the shareholder level. The shareholder would be taxed much
as he is under the current system. The corporate income tax then
would become a tax only on retained earnings.
A number of problems remain to be resolved under a system of
corporate dividend deduction. For instance, it must be decided if
the full benefits of this reform should be extended to tax-exempt share-
holders. Extending the benefits to these shareholders would result in
substantial revenue loss. To deny them the benefits, and thus reduce
revenue loss, would require imposing a withholding tax on their div-
idends equal to the corporate tax rate.
A corporate dividend deduction may frustrate the use of tax sub-
sidies. Even though most tax subsidies should be eliminated,48 some
tax subsidies may be necessary.49  With a dividend deduction, tax
subsidies would be effective only to the extent of the corporation's
retained earnings.50
Another issue that must be resolved is whether a corporation
should be allowed a carryover of its dividend deduction to other
years. For example, a corporation might pay dividends in excess of
its earnings in a particular year. If a carryover were permitted, that
excess could be carried back to a prior year when earnings exceeded
dividends, entitling the corporation to a refund of that prior year's
taxes. Alternatively, the excess could be carried forward, permitting
the corporation to retain earnings free of tax. A carryover might be
48. See Part I, supra note 2, at 339-46; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. RE.v. 705 (1970).
49. See Part I, supra note 2, at 344.
50. For example, under normal accounting principles a corporation might
have income of $100 and, assuming a 50% tax rate, a tax liability of $50. How-
ever, its taxable income, computed by using accelerated depreciation, might be
only $50, or it might qualify for an investment tax credit of $25. In either
case, to the extent its dividends-paid deduction exceeded $50, the benefit of
the tax subsidy would be lost.
Under present law dividends are taxable to the shareholder if the corpo-
ration has current or historic earnings and profits. Section 312(a). As in-
dicated in note 13 supra, earnings and profits generally mean taxable corporate
income as reduced by cororate income taxes and dividends. However, earnings
and profits are computed without allowance for various tax subsidies, such as
the percentage depletion of minerals, Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(c) (1960), the
investment tax credit, Rev. Rule 63-63, 1963-1 C. B. 10, and, since 1972, ac-
celerated depreciation. Section 312(k). Because under present law dividends
may be taxable without regard to tax subsidies, loss of the benefits of the tax
subsidy at the corporate [evel results in loss of all the benefits. Under a
system of partial integration, the definition of earnings and profits might be
changed to permit allowance of tax subsidies so that their benefits would not
be completely lost. For further discussion see text accompanying note 114 infra.
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justified as providing more complete relief from the double taxation
of corporate earnings. Earnings taxed to shareholders would be re-
lieved of corporate income tax, even though the corporate tax was
paid in a different year. A carryover would also permit integration
of the personal and corporate income taxes for liquidations, if the
liquidation were treated as a dividend to the extent of the corpora.
tion's retained earnings. 51 A carryover, however, would not necessar-
ily promote more complete integration of the personal and corporate
income taxes because the advantages of deferral would still be present.
A carryback of dividends in excess of earnings would eliminate double
taxation, but at the expense of granting shareholders in tax brackets
above the corporate income tax rate the benefit of deferral between
the year in which the corporation earned the income and the year in
which the income was distributed. A carryforward would permit a
corporation to retain future earnings, shielding these future earnings
from the individual income tax. Moreover, stock is likely to have
changed hands between the year of excess dividends and the year to
which the excess is carried. The owners of stock who benefit from
the carryover may not be the owners who were burdened when the
corporation retained earnings and thus incurred tax liability.
Limiting the deduction to promptly-paid dividends 5 2 might in-
crease current distribution of earnings, resulting in more complete
integration. Discouraging retention of earnings, however, may en-
danger necessary capital formation. The conflicting goals of full inte-
gration and promotion of capital formation may be balanced by allow-
ing only a limited carryback, such as three years.
To satisfactorily evaluate the corporate dividend deduction, it
must be compared with the shareholder dividend credit.
Shareholder Dividend Credit
With a shareholder dividend credit, the corporation would com-
pute its taxes much as it does now with no deduction for dividends.
Unlike the present system, however, this form of partial integration
would entitle the shareholder to a credit against his own tax liability
for the tax paid by the corporation on the amount distributed.
A major problem with the shareholder dividend credit is that it
is premised on the questionable assumption that the corporate income
tax is not shifted but rather is borne wholly by the shareholders." To
51. For further discussion see text accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
52. Dividends paid shortly after the end of the corporation's taxable year
might be considered current. Such a grace period would permit a corporation
to determine its taxable income for the year before deciding how large a dividend
to pay. See Section 267(a)(2).
53. See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
19771
26 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
the extent the corporate income tax is shifted, a shareholder credit
would result in undertaxation of dividends." Because dividends
would be taxed at the corporate level, the problem of shifting would
be more severe with dividend credits than with dividend deduc-
tions. A partial credit might provide a crude adjustment for possible
shifting."'
In providing a shareholder credit for dividends received, the
dividend must be "grossed up" to reflect the tax paid by the corpora-
tion on that amount. For example, if a corporation were subject to
a tax rate of 50% it would have to earn $200 to pay a $100 dividend
from its after-tax income. The shareholder may be viewed as entitled
to a $200 dividend with $100 paid to the IRS as a withholding tax.
The shareholder's position is like that of an employee who receives
only $8,000 of his $10,000 salary, the remainder being withheld and
paid to the IRS.56 For both the shareholder and the wage earner,
both cash received and amounts withheld must be included in income.
Amounts withheld may then be claimed as a credit against the tax
liability on the income so determined. Thus assuming a 50% corporate
income tax rate, a shareholder receiving a $100 dividend would have
$200 "grossed up" income and a $100 tax credit."'
To prevent overtaxing shareholders in lower brackets, the credit
would have to be refundable if it exceeded the shareholder's tax liabil-
ity. If the credit were not refundable only those shareholders in tax
brackets as high as the corporate tax rate or those with other taxable
54. To the extent double taxation under the present system causes shifting
of the corporate income tax, partial integration would make shifting less likely.
The question, however, is not whether shifting would occur, but rather how fast
any present shifting would be undone.
55. If the corporate income tax is shifted, the amount shifted should be
treated as a business expense to be deducted in determining income, and not
as income tax. In the example in note 42 supra, the tax-free rate of return on
stock and other capital was 12%. The new equilibrium rate of return after the
imposition of a 50% corporate income tax was 18% on stock, halved -to 9% by the
tax, and 9% on other capital. In such a case, only two-thirds of apparent cor-
porate earnings are real, the remainder being the mechanism of shifting. The
burden of the corporate income tax on shareholders is only 25% of these real
earnings. Accordingly, corporate income should be reduced one-third, and only
25% of this reduced amount should be used to compute the shareholder credit.
56. Withholding on wages is covered by Sections 3401-3404.
57. Failure to gross-up would understate shareholder income in proportion
to the corporate tax rate. The shareholder would realize a benefit both from'
the amount distributed and from the corporate tax paid in regard to that amount.
The amount distributed would be cash in hand, and the tax might be used as a
credit against the shareholder's tax liability. It has long been established that
one's payment of another's tax liability may be income to that other person.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). Taxing the
shareholder on the benefit received in cash but not on the benefit received as
a credit would in effect tax the shareholder only on the corporation's after-tax
earnings even though he received benefits from all the earnings. This could
produce the anamoly that capitalists might lobby for a 100% corporate tax rate
while socialists might lobby to repeal the tax.
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income could take full advantage of the credit. Other shareholders
would still be overtaxed and thus discouraged from investing in
stock.58
How to determine the proper rate of credit presents problems.
The theoretical 48% corporate income tax rate may not be appropriate
because corporations often are taxed at lower rates. The surtax exemp-
tion limits the tax on the first $25,000 of income to 20% and on the
next $25,000 to 22%.51 Tax subsidies such as accelerated depreciation
and the investment tax credit result in corporations paying less than
the statutory rate on income as defined under normal accounting
principles.80
Eliminating the surtax exemption would solve the first problem."'
If the exemption survives, however, and if a corporation distributes
less than all of its earnings, there are three ways to determine how
much the distributed earnings were taxed and thus the amount of
the shareholder's credit. The dividend could be deemed paid first
from earnings under the surtax exemption, or last from those earnings,
or from all earnings subject to the average tax paid by the corpora-
tion. 2 The first approach would eliminate the benefits of the exemp-
tion to the extent dividends are paid, the second would preserve those
benefits to the extent earnings are retained, and the third would elim-
58. For example, a corporation might pay a $100 per share dividend. As-
suming a 50% corporate tax rate, the holder of one share would have $200
income and a $100 tax credit. A shareholder in a 50% or higher tax bracket
would fully use the credit against his tax liability on the dividend. A share-
holder in the 40% tax bracket, who would need only $80 for his $100 credit
to cover his tax liability on the dividend, might use the remaining $20 of his
credit against his tax liability on other income such as interest or salary. But
a shareholder in a tax bracket below the corporate rate who had little other
income-such as a retired person whose income consists of tax-exempt social
security and dividends--could not fully use the credit unless it was refundable.
59. Section 11.
60. See Tax Notes, TAX ANALYSTS & ADVOCATES, at 26-33 (Nov. 17, 1975)
(typical tax rates are 20%-40%, not the theoretical 48%); G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX REFORM 91 (1975).
61. The surtax exemption is hard to justify. A subsidy to the middle class
should be based on individual income. The surtax exemption is not determined
on an individual basis, however, since there may be little correlation between
a corporation's income and its owner's tax brackets: small corporations may be
owned by the wealthy, and large corporations may ,have many shareholders in
low tax brackets. Furthermore, a subsidy to small business should apply to
all businesses, not only to corporations. See Bucovetsky & Bird, Tax Reform
in Canada: A Progress Report, 25 NAT. TAx J. 15, 34 (1972).
62. For a corporation which earned $100,000 and distributed $20,000, the
three methods would entitle shareholders to credits of $5,000, $18,461.54, and
$10,534.35 respectively. These figures are obtained by solving the equation,
Credit = 1 a 1 Dividend, using tax rates of 20%, 48%, and 34.5%. The( -Tax Rate )
computations would be simplified with a 50% corporate income tax and no surtax
exemption.
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inate the benefits in proportion to the percentage of earning distrib-
uted.6 3
Tax subsidies such as accelerated depreciation and the investment
tax credit may result in a corporation having less taxable income or
lower tax liability than it would under normal accounting principles.
A shareholder dividend credit, like the present system, requires com-
putation of a corporation's income in order to determine the extent
to which a dividend is taxable to the shareholder because only distri-
butions of earnings are included in shareholder income. Unlike the
present, system, however, computing the corporation's tax liability
would be necessary under a shareholder dividend credit in order to
determine what credit the shareholder would be allowed. The prob-
lem is whether to use tax accounting or normal accounting to measure
the corporation's income and tax liability. The present system uses
normal accounting to compute a corporation's income for purposes of
determining whether a dividend is taxable. 64 Using this approach and
basing the credit on the taxes in fact paid by the corporation would
tend to eliminate the benefit of the tax subsidy, in effect converting
it into a mere reduction in the withholding rate on dividends, while
leaving dividends fully taxable. A second possibility is to base the
credit on the statutory rate applied to income determined under
normal accounting. This approach, however, would substantially
increase the cost of tax subsidies because shareholders would re-
ceive refunds of taxes never paid by the corporation. A more
satisfactory approach is to base the taxability of dividends on the
corporation's income as computed for tax purposes and base the
shareholder credit on the corporation's tax liability on that income.
To the extent the corporation's tax payments were reduced by non-
refundable credits like those for investment and foreign taxes, the
shareholder credit would be nonrefundable. Shareholders would re-
ceive tax-free cash when a corporation's distribution exceeded its tax-
able income, just as present tax subsidies produce tax-free cash from
unincorporated businesses. This result is consistent with the purpose
of integration because it taxes income from corporations and other
businesses similarly.
63. Under each of the three possibilities, the corporation would have paid
taxes reduced in the same amount by the surtax exemption. But the effect of
the surtax exemption is best measured by the total taxes paid by both corpora-
tion and shareholder. Under the first possibility, the shareholder's credit is
only 20% to 22%; thus his additional tax liability will be larger, or his refund
smaller, than under the second possibility where the shareholder's credit may
be up to 48%. The third possibility falls between the first two, depending on
the corporation's income and the amount of the dividend.
This question of ordering arises only if the corporation has more than $25,000
of income and becomes significant only if its income exceeds $50,000 and not
all of its earnings are distributed.64. See note 50 supra, for a discussion of the treatment of tax subsidies in
determining earnings and profits.
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A corporation's distribution of a prior year's earnings presents
deferral problems when the shareholder's tax liability on the distribu-
tion does not equal his credit, because of the delay between the year
in which the income was earned and the year in which the share-
holder pays any additional tax or receives a refund. By adding inter-
est payments to the shareholder's tax or refund, these deferral prob-
lems could be reduced.65 Computations would be easier if dividends
were considered as paid first from the current year's earnings, work-
ing backwards as necessary.66
The shareholder dividend credit as usually proposed integrates
the personal and corporate income tax only for dividends, not for
retained earnings. 67  Integration could be extended to retained earn-
ings by treating a sale of stock or a liquidation as a dividend of those
earnings. The shareholder would increase his amount realized upon
sale or liquidation by the amount of tax paid by the corporation on
his share of the retained earnings, obtaining a credit for that amount.6 8
A purchaser of stock in a corporation with retained earnings would
be taxed only on distributions of corporate income earned while he
held the stock.69
Because a shareholder's tax liability under a dividend credit sys-
tem would be dependent on the corporation's tax liability, a change
in the corporation's taxes because of a refund claim or an audit might
affect the shareholder's taxes. Adjusting the returns of the many
individual shareholders in a large corporation could create substantial
administrative problems. 70 These problems would arise, however,
65. The shareholder would compute his tax liability on all his income, and
subtract from this his tax liability on his income other than dividends from old
retained earnings. Cf. Section 1348(a). If this amount exceeded his credit
in regard to those dividends, he would pay that amount with interest between
the year of the dividend and the year the corporation earned the amounts not
distributed. If the credit were greater, he would be paid interest. If the
distribution included earnings from more than one year, separate computations
would be required for each year. See Part I, supra note 2, at 396.
66. Dividends paid from pre-effective date earnings should not entitle the
shareholder to a credit.
67. For example, the Ford administration proposed a system of partial inte-
gration limited to dividends. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 31, 1975) (statement of Treasury Secre-
tary William E. Simon). It would allow a corporate deduction for one-half
of dividends paid, and a shareholder credit for one-half of dividends received.
The final tax reform proposal from the Ford administration included a system of
full integration, while still commending partial integration as a first step. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAX REFORM (January 17, 1977).
68. The interest charge proposed in text accompanying notes 65-66 supra,
would reduce the effects of deferral.
69. The extension of the dividend credit to sales and liquidations would
increase the record-keeping burden on corporations and present certain mechanical
problems, such as how to allocate earnings when stock is traded during the year.
See text accompanying notes 142-48 infra.
70. See text accompanying notes 149-64 infra, for a discussion of the prob-
lems involved in adjusting shareholder taxes when corporate taxes change.
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only if the corporation distributed more than its. reported after-tax
income and its taxable income were later changed, or if a refund
claim reduced its taxable income below the amount distributed in
that year.71
A comparison of these two forms of partial integration suggests
that neither form is necessarily preferrable to the other. Although
the relative benefits of the shareholder dividend credit would be more
certain, the benefits of the corporate dividend deduction possibly
would be greater. The credit would better limit revenue loss because
of tax-exempt persons.72 It would also permit resolution of the prob-
lems of carryover and integration of retained earnings. The deduc-
tion, however, would not require changing shareholder taxes when
corporate taxes are changed. The risk of shifting the corporate income
tax 'also would be reduced with the deduction. If empirical data
shows that the audit and refund claim problem would occur infre-
quently, and if the political process 73 should decide that shifting is
not a serious problem, the credit would be preferable.
The advantages of both forms of partial integration are outweighed
by their disadvantages. Both the advantages and disadvantages of
partial integration are produced by one feature: the personal and
corporate income taxes would be integrated for dividends but not
for retained earnings. 74 Because only dividends would be integrated,
partial integration would require only a relatively minor and easily
implemented change in our present system. The major disadvantage
of partial integration is its failure to resolve the problem of the taxa-
tion of retained earnings. 75 Thus, the tax shelter for individuals in
high tax brackets would be left untouched.76 In addition, partial
71. This statement is premised on the elimination of the surtax exemption.
See note 61 supra. Continuing that exemption would increase the occasions
when a change in a corporation's taxes would require an adjustment of its share-
holders' taxes.
Even though a corporation distributes more than its after-tax income, a
change in corporate income for that year will not require an adjustment of the
shareholder's taxes if the remainder of the dividend was taxable because the
corporation had retained earnings from prior years. In such a case, however,
an adjustment would be required in the interest charge as proposed in text
accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
72. See Hammer, The Taxation of Income from Corporate Shareholding, 28
NAT. TAX J. 315, 324 (1975), which suggests that Germany is shifting from
a primarily dividend deduction system to a system including greater use of share-
holder credits. This new system will make the policy of controlling the degree
of relief provided to different shareholders easier to implement.
73. The social sciences seem unable to determine how the corporate income
tax is shifted. See Part I, supra note 2, at 327 n.22.
74. Partial integration also fails to integrate corporate losses into the personal
income tax system.
75. The modifications suggested to extend partial integration to retained earn-
ings in text accompanying notes 51, 67-69 supra, would add substantial complex-
ity, thus negating the simplicity which is partial integration's major advantage.
76. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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integration would cause a significant reduction in tax revenue, even
more than under full integration.7" Moreover, much of the complexity
of the present system would continue because retained earnings would
still be subject to two systems of taxation.78 Finally, because retained
earnings may be taxed again when stock is sold, the double taxation
justification for the capital gains preference would remain under par-
tial integration.7 9
TAXING DPrAENDS AND APPR=AnTON
The personal and corporate income taxes could be integrated by
taxing shareholders currently on the benefits of stock ownership.
Those benefits would include unrealized appreciation in stock values,
which are not taxed under the present system, as well as dividends
and realized gains. Because unrealized gains would be taxable, un-
realized losses would be deductible, so that only net benefits would
be taxed.80
A major issue under a system of taxing dividends and apprecia-
tion is whether to eliminate the corporate income tax. The leading
advocate of this reform would retain the corporate tax.81 He argues
that because that tax is either shifted or capitalized it does not pro-
duce double taxation. Moreover, to the extent the tax has been capi-
talized its repeal would produce windfall gains to those already
owning stock, primarily the wealthy.82 These arguments are not persua-
sive. Although the corporate income tax is probably at least partially
shifted, it seems unlikely that it is shifted entirely.8" The part that
is not shifted may result in double taxation of corporate earnings.
Even the part which is shifted is still being borne by someone-
consumers, wage earners, or owners of capital other than corporate
stock-and that burden is undesirable. The problem with the argu-
ment that if the corporate tax is not shifted, then it is capitalized is
77. The amount of revenue lost under partial integration depends on corpo-
rate dividend policies. In G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 100,
103 (1975), the authors estimate that under present dividend policies, partial
integration would lose $15 billion in tax revenues in regard to stock held by
individuals, but the similar loss under full integration would be only $7 billion.
Under both full and partial integration there would be additional revenue loss
because of stock held by tax-exempt organizations. See text accompanying notes
117-24 infra.
78. See text accompanying notes 6-30 supra.
79. See Part I, supra note 2, at 316, 325-28.
80. Both gains and losses, whether realized or not, should be adjusted for
inflation as proposed in Part I, supra note 2, at 337-39.
81. Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation in Publicly Held
Stock, 76 YALE L. J. 623, 664-74 (1967).
82. See Part I, supra note 2, at 324 n.12, for data on stock ownership. See
text accompanying notes 183-86 infra, for further discussion of capitalization of
the present system of taxing corporations and shareholders.
83. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
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the uncertainty as to how it is capitalized. The argument is that an
unshifted corporate tax would overtax stock ownership, lowering stock
prices. The present corporate tax has long existed, so that most share-
holders purchased their stock at prices depressed by the tax. There-
fore, those shareholders have not been treated unfairly. A repeal of
the corporate tax would remove the depressing effect on stock prices,
and those shareholders would receive windfall profits. However, in-
come from stock ownership may now be undertaxed because of the
benefits of deferral and capital gains."4 Thus, the present system
may have increased stock prices, and a change in the system would
produce windfall losses. The effects of any windfall changes in stock
prices would be reduced by recognizing unrealized gains and losses
under a dividend and appreciation tax. Accordingly, it would seem
best to eliminate the corporate tax.
A dividend and appreciation tax has substantial advantages. Re-
peal of the corporate income tax would eliminate the burden of
determining and collecting that tax. Changes in the price of publicly-
held stock could be determined easily from market quotations.85 Div-
idends would be reported under existing mechanisms. Because all
dividends would be taxable, it would be unnecessary to compute a
corporation's earnings and profits or to determine whether the distri-
bution was in complete or partial liquidation.8 Taxing all dividends
would not result in taxing a shareholder on his capital rather than
only on his income because he would be allowed to deduct any
decline in the value of his stock."7
There are several problems, however, which a dividend and ap-
preciation tax would not solve. It could not be applied to foreign
corporations, so a special tax would be required for them. Foreign
owners of stock in domestic corporations could be taxed on dividends
through a withholding tax, but taxing appreciation in their stock might
be impractical. It would also be difficult to apply a dividend and
appreciation tax to a closely-held corporation's shareholders because
determining the value of stock for which there is no regular market
poses problems. Another tax system might have to be developed
for those corporations. The two systems would be unfair and would
84. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
85. See Section 1023(h)(1).
86. See note 50 supra for a discussion of earnings and profits and notes 15,
17-18 supra for liquidations.
87. An example may be helpful. Suppose A's basis in his stock at the start
of the year was $100. If A received $150 as a distribution in liquidation, he
would have income of $150 under a system of dividend and appreciation taxa-
tion. But his stock at the end of the year presumably would be worthless, so
he, could deduct a loss of $100. Therefore, his net income would be $50. If
the corporation distributed only some of its property, A's net income would
depend on whether the value of his stock declined, and not on such concepts
as earnings and profits or liquidation.
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distort the market if they did not produce similar results. Special
provisions would be required for the transition from one tax system
to the other to accomodate corporate shifts between being publicly
held and closely held.8 8
Dividend and appreciation taxation would cause even more than
the normal problems associated with a general system of taxing un-
realized appreciation. 9 Problems of equity and distortion of the econ-
omy would result from differing tax treatments of different types of
investment. Moreover, limiting the taxation of unrealized appreciation
to publicly-traded stock might cause excessive fluctuations in govern-
ment revenue because of the uncertainties of the market. The move-
ments in stock prices often will not parallel the movements in the price
of other investments such as real estate or bonds. Fluctuations in tax
revenues might be dampened by differing price movements of dif-
ferent investments only if a general tax on all unrealized appreciation
were imposed. While taxing all unrealized appreciation may be
desirable, the limited approach of dividend and appreciation taxation
is not.
FULL INTEGRATION
Under full integration corporate income would be taxed to the
shareholders as earned, whether the income was distributed or re-
tained, and the shareholders would currently deduct corporate losses.
Thus, the corporate income tax would be eliminated.90 The share-
holder's basis would be increased by his share of corporate income
and decreased for losses. Distributions received from the corporation
would reduce the shareholder's basis in his stock, and would be tax-
able only after his basis had been recovered. 91
88. For example, a closely-held corporation might have a public offering of
its stock; a public corporation might become closely-held by repurchasing its
stock; or a public corporation might merge with a closely-held corporation.
89. See Part I, supra note 2, at 375-86, for a discussion of taxing unrealized
appreciation.
Although in general over long periods stock prices increase by the amount
of retained earnings, Break,. Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income
Taxes, 22 NAT. TAX J. 39, 45-48 (1969), stock prices may change with little
regard to retained earnings over the annual accounting period used for income
tax purposes. Thus, unlike both full and partial integration, a dividend and
appreciation tax is not a means of taxing corporate income to stockholders.
90. A withholding tax might be imposed on corporations. See text accom-
panying notes 94-98 infra.
91. For example, A might purchase a share of stock for $100. If during the
first year the corporation's income allocable to that stock were $15, A would
have income of $15 and his basis would be increased to $115. If the corporation
paid a $10 dividend, A would not have additional income. Instead his basis
would be reduced by $10 to $105. If the next year the corporation had a loss,
A would deduct the loss allocable to his stock and his basis would be reduced
by the amount deducted.
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Full integration would eliminate the double taxation of corporate
earnings because only the shareholder would be taxed on corporate
earnings. The double taxation argument for applying the capital
gains preference to gain on sale of stock would also be eliminated.92
Full integration would also eliminate many of the effects of deferral,
such as the advantages for shareholders in tax brackets above the cor-
porate income tax rate and the disadvantage for those in lower tax
brackets. Finally, eliminating the corporate income tax would solve
the problems created by the possible shifting of that tax.
Integrating the personal and corporate income taxes by taxing
all corporate earnilngs currently to shareholders may cause some prac-
tical problems. The shareholder, the government, and even the econ-
omy may suffer cash flow problems. A variety of mechanical prob-
lems,, such as how to treat stock sold during the year, complex
corporate ownership, and audits also would be created. Finally, the
process of transition from the present system of taxing corporations
and shareholders to full integration would pose problems which must
be explored.
Cash Flow Problems
Paying Shareholder Taxes. Cash flow problems would arise be-
cause a shareholder would be required to pay tax on corporate earn-
ings, whether or not distributed, even though he had not received
resources with which to pay the tax.93 Under our present system,
however, tax liability may be imposed in a number of situations al-
though nothing has been received or receipts are not in cash. Be-
cause individuals normally have a variety of resources, taxation with-
out receipt would not present significant hardship in many instances.
No greater hardship is imposed on those who have to sell some of
their stock to pay the tax than on those with cash incomes who can
buy less stock initially because some of their income must be used
to pay taxes.
Cash flow problems might be more acute under full integration
than under a system of taxing unrealized appreciation in one signifi-
cant respect. In taxing unrealized appreciation, normally the gain
subject to tax can be realized by selling the property, and thus funds
can be obtained with which to pay the tax. Undistributed earnings,
however, may not cause an equivalent rise in the price of stock. Con-
sequently, it would be impossible for the shareholder to realize this
gain upon which he has been taxed. On the other hand, profitable
corporations normally pay dividends. Even if the stock price did not
92. See Part I, supra note 2, at 325-28.
93. See Part I, supra note 2, at 383-85, for a discussion of taxpayer cash
flow problems which would result if unrealized appreciation were taxed.
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increase in proportion to retained earnings, dividend payments could
ease the burden of paying taxes on gain which cannot be currently
realized.
Moreover, any cash-flow problems under full integration may be
avoidable. A withholding tax could be collected from the corporation
with the stockholder still reporting the entire corporate income alloca-
ble to his stock but treating the withholding tax as a credit, much as
amounts now withheld on wages are treated. While it may appear
to be more efficient to collect the tax once from the corporation
rather than in small fractions from each shareholder, this apparent
efficiency may never materialize. Except for the relatively few share-
holders whose marginal tax rate equals the rate paid by the corpora-
tion, individual refunds or additional collections would be required.
A more basic problem, however, is that such a system could resurrect
the shifting problem and further complicate the tax system.
Corporate managers may view the corporate withholding tax
much as they do the existing corporate income tax-as an additional
cost to recover. The corporate withholding tax can be recovered
either by raising prices or by cutting costs such as wages. As with the
existing corporate income tax, this shifting would result not only in
regressive sales and wage taxes but also in the undertaxation of cor-
porate earnings because shareholders would be treated as having
borne a tax which in fact had been shifted to others. Even though
less shifting may occur under a corporate withholding tax system than
under the present system, the result would still be undesirable.94
The risk of shifting might be reduced if the corporate withholding
tax were geared to the stockholder's marginal tax bracket rather than
applied uniformly. If withholding is based on individual shareholder
tax brackets, different corporations will have different withholding,
and this non-uniform rate will make shifting more difficult.95 More-
over, since the tax would be based on individual shareholder tax
brackets rather than on all corporate income, corporate managers may
be less likely to view the tax as a business cost to be shifted. Finally,
by individualizing corporate withholding, low-bracket taxpayers would
not be required to make, in effect, interest-free loans to the govern-
94. It should be emphasized that the problem is not whether a corporate
withholding tax would be shifted, but rather, whether and how fast the effects
of shifting under the present corporate income tax would be undone if it were
replaced by a corporate withholding tax imposed at similar rates. See McClure,
Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes, 88 HAnv. L. RPv. 532,
547-48 (1975). McClure regards as dispositive the suggestion that eventually
the tax will be unshifted, although it would seem that a five or ten year delay
in this process would be a cause for concern.
95. Shifting of the present corporate income tax is eased because most
economic activity is conducted through corporations with the same marginal
tax rate of 48%. See note 39 supra. The same may be true with a uniform
withholding tax.
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ment until refunds are returned, and the estimated tax system work-
load for high-bracket taxpayers could be reduced.
A system of individualized withholding would, understandably,
be administratively burdensome. Aside from the complexity involved
in an individual determination of each shareholder's tax bracket, such
a system might conflict with the stockholder's interests in privacy.
Even the implementation of individualized withholding would re-
quire some provision to prevent shifting ownership of corporate
earnings; otherwise each stockholder would be subjected to the aver-
age of the withholding rates.96
One solution to this problem might be to distribute to each stock-
holder fractional shares representing his share of retained corporate
earnings. 97 Aside from the difficulty of assigning values to the frac-
tional shares, the added burden of dealing with fractions of shares
makes the proposal somewhat questionable. Another possibility would
be to treat the amount withheld as an advance payment of future
dividends. Unless interest equal to the corporation's rate of return
on retained earnings accrued on the early dividend, however, gradual
shifts in ownership would occur.98
Perhaps the best general solution to any possible shareholder cash
flow problems would be to require corporations to pay dividends.
Imposing mandatory dividend requirements would be a significant
departure from the present treatment of dividend payments. Nor-
mally, such matters are determined by state corporation law and
corporate boards of directors. The purpose of a federal mandatory
dividend law would not be to control dividends as such but rather
to provide a substitute for a withholding tax which could properly
96. For example, a corporation is formed by two individuals, each con-
tributing $100. The corporation earns $20 in its first year of operation. If
one individual is in the 20% bracket and the other in the 70% bracket, the cor-
poration would pay $2 and $7 to the government as their respective with-
holdings. Corporate assets now consist of the $200 contributed plus $11 in
retained earnings for a total of $211, $105.50 owned by each stockholder. The
20% bracket stockholder, despite having contributed $100 and having $8 in
after-tax earnings for a total of $108, has a claim on only $105.50 in corporate
assets. The 70% bracket stockholder also has a claim on $105.50, although
he should be entitled to only $103.
97. Under this approach, all corporate earnings would either be paid as
dividends, paid as withholding tax, or represented by fractional shares. Be-
cause shareholders with low withholding rates would receive more fractional
shares, the shift in ownership of corporate earnings or in the burden of the
withholding tax would not occur. In the example in note 96 supra, the 20%
bracket shareholder would receive stock worth $8 and the 70% bracket share-
holder stock worth $3.
98. A corporation would retain more earnings on stock subject to a low
withholding rate, but income obtained from investing those earnings would
be equally available to all stock. The interest charge, if accurate, would
assure that income was allocated to that stock whose retained earnings produced
it. If the interest rate is too low, those subject to low withholding are hurt;
if too high, those subject to high withholding are hurt.
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be imposed. Federal tax provisions encouraging payment of dividends
already exist.99 Mandatory dividends and withholding taxes have
several similarities. Both are compulsory. Both can be used to pay
the shareholder's taxes, with any excess to be used as the shareholder
chooses. Both would result in a reduction of the shareholder's basis
in his stock. Mandatory dividends, however, are less likely to be
shifted. In many cases, the mandatory dividend would hardly differ
from the dividends normally paid in the absence of compulsion. With
dividend reinvestment plans the corporation may be able to retain
much of the mandatory dividend in any case. To the extent that
mandatory dividends would only be' a substitute for a withholding
tax and would not significantly displace corporate control of resources,
such a program would not be an improper exercise of federal power.
A mandatory dividend program might conflict with a corpora-
tion's agreements with its creditors to restrict payment of dividends.100
To the extent that the mandatory dividend may be considered a form
of withholding tax, it might abrogate these agreements. The cred-
itors could not complain, however, if the mandatory dividend did not
exceed corporate income tax liability under the present system.' 0 '
Perhaps dividend restrictions could be limited to the excess of the
mandatory dividend over what a corporation's tax liability would have
been had the corporate income tax continued. Alternatively, share-
holders might be required to reinvest any portion of the mandatory
dividend in excess of their income tax liability on the corporation's
earnings. 10 2 The problem of dividend restrictions may not be that
serious because many corporations subject to dividend restrictions
may have net operating losses to carry forward,103 and thus may not
have significant taxable income for a number of years. Although the
interaction of mandatory dividends and contractural dividend restric-
99. See the discussion of the accumulated earnings tax and the personal
holding company provisions in text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
100. This discussion deals with dividend restrictions in effect when mandatory
dividends are implemented. Thereafter, corporations and creditors may allow
for mandatory dividends in their contracts, perhaps even obtaining shareholder
consent to waive the dividends.
101. Those changes proposed in Part I of this article, supra note 2, at
337-52, regarding the measurement of gain and loss, the determination of
depreciation, and the deduction or taxation of interest would change the amount
of corporate income. Creditors who have obtained a restriction on dividends
may fairly be required to bear the risk that such changes might increase
corporate tax liability, since they would benefit if changes in the tax laws
decreased corporate tax liability.
102. This solution is most practical for closely-held corporations. For larger
corporations it would present many of the same problems as individualized with-
holding, discussed in text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
103. Section 172 generally permits net operating losses to be carried forward
seven years. Losses incurred before the implementation of full integration
would still be carried forward, but subsequent losses would be currently
deducted by shareholders.
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tions may create problems, they would not be serious enough to war-
rant the rejection of a mandatory dividend system.
A lower mandatory dividend rate would cause fewer problems.
The mandatory dividend rate would ultimately depend upon the
individual rate structure, which might be lower under the reforms
proposed here and elsewhere. 04  The mandatory dividend rate could
also be lowered by using a rate lower than the highest individual tax
bracket, such as the highest average tax rate on all income.105
Thus, shareholder cash flow problems are not insurmountable.
Shareholder cash flow, however, is only one dimension of a larger
problem. These cash flow problems should not be resolved at the ex-
pense of jeopardizing capital formation. Therefore, any discussion of
cash flow problems should also consider the needs of capital formation.
Capital Formation. Capital formation is necessary to continue
and increase the productivity of our society.'06 The modem corpora-
tion is very efficient at performing this task. Although some capital
is obtained by issuing stock, the corporation also relies to a great
extent on retained earnings as a source of new capital. The present
system of corporate taxation, under which dividends generally are
taxed more heavily than retained earnings,'0 7 encourages retention
104. The major reforms not discussed in this article are aimed at expanding
the tax base by restricting deductions and exclusions from income. Studies of
an expanded tax base have suggested that the current 14% to 70% rates might
be reduced. See, e.g., COMMITTEE TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING
THE FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE 7-10 (Fund for Public Policy Research 1973) (4% to
54%); Pechman & Okner, Stimulation of [Canada's] Carter Commission Tax
Proposals for the United States, 22 NAT. TAX. J. 1, 11 (1969) (12.8% to
53.1%); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR TAX REFORM 9 (1977)
(8% to 38%). The rate structure under a reformed tax system would depend on
political and policy decisions as to what is to be included in the tax base, how
much federal revenues should be, and how progressive the tax system should be.
105. On a joint return taxable income in excess of $203,200 is subject to a
70% rate, but the tax on $203,200 is only $110,980, an average rate of ap-
proximately 55%. The tax on $303,200 is $180,980, an average rate of approxi-
mately 60%. Setting the mandatory dividend rate at 60% would thus cover
the tax liability of a couple with $303,200 in corporate income. Persons with
more income and thus a higher average tax rate might be expected to have
other resources with which to pay the tax.
106. Some people, seeking to preserve or expand tax subsidies for invest-
ment, such as capital gains, accelerated depreciation, and the investment tax
credit, have forecast an imminent capital shortage. See, e.g., Tax Reform
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
439-446 (June 23-25, 1975) (statement of Reginald H. Jones); Tax Reform
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
13-30 (July 8, 1975) (statement of Treasury Secretary Simon). Others in
opposing such tax subsidies have noted that of five recent studies on capital
needs, only that by the New York Stock Exchange predicted a capital shortage.
See Tax Reform Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 446 (June 23-25, 1975) (statement of Harvey D. Brazer); id.
at 430-39 (statement of Joseph E. Pechman). Determining the existence or
extent of a possible capital shortage is beyond the scope of this article.
107. See note 37 supra.
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of earnings. Full integration of the personal and corporate income
taxes would eliminate the tax penalty the present system imposes on
dividends but, in doing so, it may jeopardize capital formation. 08
It is possible, however, that full integration may actually result
in an increase in retained earnings. Elimination of the corporate
income tax would make whatever portion of that tax corporations now
bear available to them. If, under full integration, dividends paid do
not exceed the sum of corporate income tax payments and dividends
under the present system, retained earnings would increase. Thus,
capital formation would be encouraged.
Capital formation through retained earnings may have socially
undesirable consequences. Concentration of corporate control may
be vested in a few corporations, contrary to the policy of our antitrust
laws and the tenets of a democratic society. In any case, retained
earnings should not always be equated with new investment. Re-
tained earnings are sometimes used to acquire existing businesses
which result in further concentration of corporate ownership without
generating new capital.109 The management which creates the re-
tained earnings may be more adept at managing the existing business
of the corporation than at selecting new businesses in which to invest.
Therefore, it may be more economically efficient to subject this new
investment to the market instead. This is not to say that retention of
earnings should be discouraged, but it is unlikely that-full integration
would significantly discourage retained earnings.
Although retained earnings are a principal means of assembling
capital," 0 it may be,, misleading to speak of retained earnings as a
source of capital. Ultimately, the source of capital is an individual's
willingness to save and defer consumption. Retained earnings may
be merely a mechanism for saving with the result that an increase in
retained earnings produces a corresponding decrease in direct personal
savings and vice versa."' Thus it may be better to foster capital for-
mation by improving the general climate for saving or investment.
108. Saving through retained earnings is likely to be encouraged under any
tax system because the transaction costs of distributing cash and seeking new
ways to invest it are avoided.
109. The acquisition of an existing business may lead indirectly to new
capital formation. For example, the sellers of the old business may use the
proceeds to purchase'a new plant and equipment, or the purchaser may buy
new assets for the old business.
110. It has been estimated that two-thirds of investment is from depreciation
and retained earnings. Tax Reform Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (July 9, 1975) (statement of Treasury
Secretary Simon). It is difficult to separate depreciation from retained earnings
because the present rules for determining depreciation for tax purposes are
inaccurate. See Part I, supra note 2, at 342 n.49.
111. For example, an individual with 100x income might want to save 20x.
If his income is all in cash, he would personally invest 20x. But if his stock
presented 15x in retained earnings and his cash income only 85x, he might
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Implementing a number of the reforms proposed in this article
would improve the climate for investment. Permitting a correction
for inflation would reduce the tax penalty on long-term investment."12
Full integration would remove the tax penalty on stock ownership for
those with middle or lower incomes. 113  Although raising capital
through the issuance of stock to smaller purchasers may involve heavy
administrative costs, a variety of intermediate institutions, such as
automatic investment plans, corporate dividend reinvestment plans,
mutual funds, pension plans and insurance companies, would reduce
the cost of assembling capital. Even if middle and lower-tax bracket
individuals invested primarily in stock already issued, this would pro-
mote the purchase of new issues by larger investors because they
would have a market in which to dispose their existing holdings.
While full integration would remove the subsidy for those in high
tax brackets, it would only put such investments on a par with other
investments. It is unlikely that the wealthy will massively shift re-
sources from investment to consumption without'a change much more
drastic than that proposed here, and, therefore, investing in general
will be promoted.
Additional stimulus to capital formation could be provided through
direct subsidies such as the investment tax credit. Even though under
full integration a corporation would not be a taxable entity, it could
use the investment tax credit against its obligation. to pay withholding
taxes or mandatory dividends, thereby improving its cash position.
Such direct subsidies would be preferable to the present system of
stimulating capital formation through corporate taxation because they
would be simpler, more equitable, and better suited to stimulate in-
vestment in new facilities or in the renovation of existing facilities. 114
Thus it appears that full integration is unlikely to pose a serious
threat to capital formation in our society.
Revenue Effects. The third aspect of the cash flow problem
posed by full integration is that of maintaining adequate government
revenues. Full integration of the personal and corporate income taxes
could reduce government revenues by $20 billion.115 Even with total
personally invest only 5x. If his stock presented 30x in retained earnings so
s cash income was only 70x, he might sell that stock and buy stock in
another corporation which retained a smaller proportion of its earnings.
112. See Part I, supra note 2, at 335-57.
113. While individuals of low or moderate income are unlikely to make
large investments, the total of many small investments may be substantial.
Analogously, the relatively small tax payments of such individuals in sum
produce a substantial portion of the federal revenues.
114. Such subsidies could make purchases of existing assets less attractive
than purchases of new assets. For example, under Section 48(c) only $100,000
of used property per taxpayer qualifies for the investment tax credit.
115. Break & Pechman, Relationship Between the Corporation and Individual
Income Taxes, 28 NAT. TAX. J. 341, 349 (1975).
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revenues of around $400 billion,116 a revenue loss of that magnitude
should not be incurred casually. That revenue loss, however, should
be put in perspective.
The reforms proposed in both parts of this article are intended
to be adopted as a package. To consider only revenue losses resulting
from one proposal may be misleading, because these losses may be
offset by revenue gains under other proposals. In any case, the fact
that tax collections change when present tax rates are applied to
income which is more accurately defined only evidences the inac-
curacy and inequity in the present system."n
More than $12 billion of the projected $20 billion revenue loss
from full integration would accrue to tax-exempt shareholders. 1 8
This revenue loss could be avoided by denying tax-exempt share-
holders the benefits of integration,"" perhaps by imposing an excise
tax on dividend income of tax-exempt organizations. 20 Such a tax,
however, would discourage tax-exempt organizations from owning
stock, causing potentially adverse effects on the economy.' 2 '
116. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YE AR 1978, 2-3
(Jan. 17, 1977) (projected $393 billion total government revenues for 1977).
117. If the proposed package of reforms resulted in significant changes in
revenue under the present rate structure, the rates could be changed in accord
with political choices about the desired level of government spending and the
proper degree of progression.
Because many states have income taxes based on the federal income tax,
changes in federal definitions of items of income and deduction such as those
proposed in this article may change state income tax collections. Elaboration of
the impact of these proposed reforms on state taxes is beyond the scope of this
article. As does the federal government, state governments may change the tax
rates to be applied to income determined under these reforms. Integrating the
personal and corporate income taxes presents an additional problem, however.
Taxing corporate earnings only to shareholders will move the tax base from the
states where corporations operate to the states where shareholders reside. To
prevent loss of revenue, states will probably continue to collect a corporate
income tax. Shareholders may be taxed on all corporate earnings, and allowed
a credit for corporate income taxes paid to any state. Presumably only that
part of the credit attributable to corporate taxes paid to the shareholder's state
would be refundable. Full integration-with each shareholder filing an individual
income tax return in each state which taxes a corporation whose stock he owns-
would be impractical.
118. Break & Pechman, supra note 115. Although tax-exempt organizations
are not normally taxed directly (they may, however, be subject to tax on un-
related business income under Sections 511-515), income earned by a corporation
attributable to stock they own is subject to the corporate income tax.
119. See, e.g., McClure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income
Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HAuv. L. REV.
532, 576 (1975).
120. A similar excise tax could be imposed under the corporate dividend
deduction discussed in text accompanying notes 48-52 supra. The same effect
could be achieved 'under the shareholder dividend credit, see text accompanying
notes 53-71 supra, by not allowing the credit to tax-exempt organizations.
121. It has been estimated that 24% of all corporate earnings are attributable
to tax-exempt organizations. G. BREAx & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAx REFORM
103 (1975).
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Under full integration, the propriety of extending exemption bene-
fits would be presented more clearly than under the present system.
Perhaps the benefits provided by these tax-exempt organizations would
be found to justify the potential revenue loss. 122  If not, an excise
tax might be imposed on all income of those organizations. A more
refined solution would restrict the organizations and activities exempt
from tax,'2 ' or the rules on deductions for contributions of appreciated
property might be tightened. 124 Similarly, the tax exemption for pen-
sion plans could be narrowed. The maximum tax-exempt amount
under a pension plan could be lowered well below the present limit
of $75,000.12 Thus, refining the present tax-exemption standards
could result in the generation of revenues sufficient to replace a sig-
nificant amount of the losses likely to occur as a result of the imple-
mentation of full integration.
By adjusting the existing system of withholding taxes on divi-
dends paid to non-residents, little revenue need be lost to foreign
shareholders upon the advent of full integration.126  Moreover, by
ending the deferral of tax on the earnings of foreign subsidiaries of
domestic corporations, full integration might even produce a revenue
gain of $2 billion.127
122. For example, it would be very expensive for the government to support
the schools, hospitals, research facilities, museums, etc., now provided by tax-
exempt charitable foundations, and it would be unconstitutional for the govern-
ment to support churches directly. Similarly, the complete tax exemption of
private pension plans may be justifiable because they reduce the strain on the
Social Security system.
123. Section 501(c) lists over twenty types of tax-exempt organizations.
Some, such as "professional football leagues (whether or not administering a
pension fund for football players)," Section 50(c)(6), seem hard to justify.
124. Under Section 170, an individual may deduct the fair market value of
property he gives to a charitable foundation. If the property has appreciated,
he will be denied a deduction for the gain which would have been ordinary
income had the property been sold. Section 170(e) (1) (B). Thus, eliminating
the capital gains preference will also eliminate deductions for that portion of
the value of property which represents appreciation. Under present law, de-
ductions for capital gain appreciation may be halved by Section 170(e) ( 1) (B),
and the total deductions for contributions of property with such appreciation
are limited by Section 170(b)(1)(C).
125. Section 415(b)(1). For example, the tax exemption might be limited
to plans which would pay pensions only up to some low multiple of the nations
median income. Once an individual's vested interest in the plan provided such
a pension, further contributions would not be deductible, and earnings beyond
those needed for such a pension would be currently taxed to the individual.
126. See Break & Pechman, supra note 115. The mechanics of taxing inter-
national. investment are discussed in Bird, International Aspects of Integration,
28 NAT. TAx J. 302 (1975). Bird notes that avoiding discriminatory taxation
of foreign investment is simpler if all countries have separate personal and
corporate income taxes. He then outlines methods of achieving nondiscrimina-
tion for situations in which some countries have separate personal and corporate
income taxes, others have partial integration, and others have full integration.
127. Tax Reform Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th
Cong. 1st Sess. 1924 (July 21, 1975) (statement of Stanford Ross).
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Thus it appears that neither the shareholders' need for cash to
pay taxes accruing from stockholdings, the general societal need for
capital formation, nor tax revenues will be seriously jeopardized by
full integration of the personal and corporate income taxes. Various
practical problems in converting to and administering a system of full
integration, however, must be considered.
Mechanical Problems
Differences in Corporate and Shareholder Basis. The theory of
full integration is to tax all corporate earnings currently to share-
holders as though the income were earned directly by the shareholder.
Basis is an important element in determining income, both with re-
spect to measuring gain or loss on sale of property and in computing
deductions for depreciation. 128  Differences in basis between the cor-
poration and its shareholders or even among the shareholders will
complicate the determination of income.
An example may make this problem clearer. A corporation might
be formed by A contributing $10,000 cash and B contributing prop-
erty worth $10,000 but with a basis of $4,000. Under present law
B would not recognize gain on his contribution of appreciated prop-
erty,129 and the corporation would have the same basis in the property
as B.180  If the corporation then sold the property it would have a
gain of $6,000. If the gain were allocated between A and B, A would
be taxed on $3,000 gain, even though he had paid $10,000 for an
interest in a corporation still worth only $10,000. B, on the other hand,
started with property whose value had appreciated $6,000. He would
have an interest in a corporation which had recognized that apprecia-
tion, yet he would be taxed on a gain of only $3,000.38s
128. Sections 167(g), 1001.
129. Section 351.
130. Section 362.
131. Similar problems would arise if B sold his stock to C for $10,000 before
the corporation sold the appreciated property. B would recognize a gain of
$6,000, the $4,000 basis he had in the property being his basis in his stock.
Section 358. Since the corporation's basis in the property still would be only
$4,000, a gain of $6,000 would be recognized when the property is sold. A
and C would be taxed on this gain, even though each paid $10,000 for an
interest in the corporation which would still be worth only $10,000. A cor-
poration might buy property which subsequently appreciates. Later the share-
holders might sell their stock and then the corporation its property. The
original shareholders would be taxed on the appreciation in the property to
the extent it is reflected in the value of their stock, much as it would be for
B above. That gain would also be taxed to the new shareholders when the
corporation sells the property, much as it would be for C above. Similar
problems would be presented when the corporation uses the property and takes
depreciation deductions, rather than selling it. The corporation's basis in
the property for computing depreciation may be less than the amount the
shareholders paid to acquire an interest in the property by purchasing stock
in the corporation.
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Problems would arise, then, when the corporation's basis in prop-
erty is less than the property's value. Reforms proposed in this
article would make such a situation less likely. By increasing basis
to correct for inflation, 132 one of the common causes for basis' being
less than value would be eliminated. Since basis would be reduced
for depreciation,'83 the elimination of accelerated methods of depre-
ciation '3 would result in smaller reductions in basis and thus end
another common cause of differences between the property's basis and
its value.
The problems arising from differences in the shareholders' and
the corporation's bases relate only to when rather than whether each
will be fully taxed on their total gain or loss. For example, when A
contributes $10,000 cash and B contributes property worth $10,000
but with a basis of only $4,000, each would be taxed on a gain of
$3,000 when the corporation sold the property. A would be taxed
on $3,000 of phantom gain, and B would be taxed on only $3,000 of
his real $6,000 gain. Each shareholder's basis in his stock would be
increased by his share of the gain recognized-A's from $10,000 to
$13,000, B's from $4,000 to $7,000. When the shareholders later sell
their stock, A would have a loss of $3,000, offsetting the $3,000 phan-
tom gain reported earlier, and B would report an additional gain of
$3,000, so that all the appreciation is eventually taxed to B. Because
of the advantages of tax deferral, the problems created by different
stock bases are significant. A would be, in effect, making an interest-
free loan to B until B finally bears the full tax consequences of the
appreciation in the property he contributed to the corporation. These
problems, however, are not as severe as having some gains doubly
taxed and others exempt from tax, as under the present system. Per-
haps the system could be reformed to account for differences in basis
between the corporation and its shareholders, or the resolution of
the problems could be left to the market for restructuring of the
terms of the transaction by the parties themselves.'
By treating differences in basis within corporations like differences
in basis within partnerships, this reformed tax system could resolve
these basis problems. For example, where A contributed cash and
B contributed appreciated property, A and B might be permitted to
agree that gain will be disproportionately allocated to B and that
depreciation will be disproportionately allocated to A."6  Similarly,
132. See Part I, supra note 2, at 335-39.
133. Section 1016(a)(2).
134. See Part I, supra note 2, at 339-46.
135. Our present system of taxing corporations does not attempt to deal gen-
erally with this problem. But see Section 334.
136. Section 704(c)(2). See generally A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION,
ch. 14 (2d ed. 1976).
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when a person purchased stock in an existing corporation, the cor-
porate basis in the property might be adjusted in regard to the new
shareholder.'5 7  These provisions, however, may only be practical
for closely held corporations with few major assets and whose stock
is sold only infrequently. Even then, substantial complexity would
result. Nevertheless, such tax provisions might be made available
as an option for small corporations under a system of full integration.
To a large extent, the parties to the transaction could eliminate
the adverse consequences of different bases between the corporation
and its shareholders by simply restructuring the terms of the trans-
action. For instance, the transaction could be restructured by hav-
ing B also contribute $10,000 in cash and having the corporation buy
B's property. The corporation would have a basis in the property
equal to its former value and B would have to recognize a gain of
$6,000. Alternatively, B might lease the property to the corporation,
thereby avoiding the tax consequences of recognition of gain, but
perhaps at the cost of causing cash-flow problems for the corporation.
Another alternative is for the parties to adjust the transaction to
reflect more accurately the true value of each contribution. Because
A would be temporarily but unfairly bearing part of B's tax burden,
A could obtain a larger stock interest than B. If equal ownership
shares were desired, B could contribute cash equivalent to the value
of the tax deferral in addition to the property. 8 8 One disadvantage
of structuring the transaction in this manner would be that it effec-
tively results in double taxation for B since the value of his property
contribution would be reduced by the amount of the future tax
liability.189
137. Section 743(b). See generally A. Wsluis, supra note 136, ch. 28.
138. A in effect would be making an interest-free loan to the government
from the time he was taxed on phantom gain when the corporation sells the
property until -he sold his stock and had an offsetting loss. Over a short period
the adjustment would be slight. But as the time between corporate sale of
property and shareholder sale of stock increased, the value of the offsetting
loss deduction would decrease. At the limit, that deduction would have no
present value. For example, A might expect a tax liability of $1,000 on his
share of the gain of $6,000 when the corporation sells the property. From
A's perspective, the half of the corporation for which he paid $10,000 would
be worth only $9,000 because he would be exposed to $1,000 tax liability. If
his half were worth $9,000, the whole would be worth $18,000. A should
insist either that he get five shares for each four that B gets -because A is con-
tributing $10,000 to a corporation worth $18,000, or that B contribute $2,000
cash in addition to the property if B is to have an equal interest. If A's
ownership increased relative to B's, his share of the gain would increase,
suggesting the need for further adjustments in relative stock ownership. Such
adjustments, however, would be slight. Increasing A's ownership from one-half
to five-ninths would increase his tax liability only $111.11. Again adjusting the
percentages of ownership for this small amount would probably not be worth
the mathematical computations required.
139. In the example in note 138 supra, if B sold the property, his tax
liability might be $2,000; thus, the value of the property net of tax would be
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In most cases, however, a substantial adjustment would not be
necessary. Where the corporation does not sell the property for sev-
eral years, the tax advantages of deferral would reduce the degree
of adjustment required. If the delay between corporate sale of the
property and the shareholder's sale of his stock is short, as it would
be in most instances, the adjustments required would be minimal
since they would only need to reflect interest on the taxes rather
than the taxes themselves. 140
The problem of differing shareholder and corporate bases per-
tains primarily to small, closely-held corporations. The next three
subsections discuss problems likely to be more severe with larger
corporations: allocating income when stock is traded, issued or re-
deemed during the corporation's tax year; audits; and complex own-
ership structures.
Stock Traded During the Year. Allocating a corporation's income
when no shares are traded, issued or redeemed can be done simply
by dividing the income by the number of shares. The process be-
comes more complex if shares have been traded because income must
then be allocated to all holders of the shares during the year. Similar
problems are presented when shares are either issued or redeemed
during the year. Determining the proper allocation would be simpli-
fied because it would only be necessary to consider how much income
to allocate to the person holding stock at the end of the year.141 If
only $8,000. Contributing property worth $8,000 for a four-ninths interest in
a corporation which also has $10,000 cash, or contributing the property and
$2,000 cash for a half interest in a corporation with an additional $10,000
in cash, seems fair. But in either case B would still be subject to a tax of
either $888.89 or $1,000 when the corration sells the property. Thus,
although in the transaction B's property had been valued as though he had
already paid tax on the appreciation, he would still have to pay tax on a part
of that appreciation. In effect, B would be doubly taxed.
This problem may not be as severe as presented above. The corporation
may not sell the property for several years. The advantage of deferral would
reduce A's effective tax exposure, thus reducing the adjustment he may
demand and consequently reducing B's exposure to effective double taxation.
The problem would be reduced if A's tax bracket were less than B's. A would
insist that the value of B's contribution be treated as reduced by the tax
liability A would have if he had to recognize the gain in B's property. In
effect, the gain would be taxed to B at A's tax rate. B would then in fact
be taxed at his own tax rate on half the gain when the corporation sells the
property. If A's tax rate were less than one-half B's, B would be better off
than if he had sold the property. The efforts of persons with appreciated
property to seek out others in lower tax brackets with whom they may form
corporations may promote the redistribution of wealth in our society.
It should be re-emphasized that this discussion focuses on the extreme case
where there is an infinite delay between the time when the corporation sells
the property and when the shareholder sells his stock.
140. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
141. It would still be necessary to allocate earnings throughout the year
when stock is transferred by gift or inheritance unless the gains or losses on
such transfers are recognized. See Part I, supra note 2, at 372-75.
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a person sold his stock before the end of the year, reporting that
income or loss would produce an offsetting change in gain or loss
recognized on sale of the stock.'42
Three methods of. allocating corporate earnings are available.
The earnings could be entirely allocated to the person holding the
stock at the end of the year, entirely allocated to the person holding
the stock at the start of the year,'143 or proportionately allocated among
those holding stock during the year. Each of these methods could
be easily administered as none would require keeping records of
former shareholders.
Allocating all earnings to the person holding the stock at the
end of the corporation's tax year might disrupt securities markets.
As the year's end approached, it might become fairly clear that a
corporation would have net income or net loss and what the amount
of that income or loss would be. People might then buy or sell
particular stocks for their own tax planning purposes. Thus a share-
holder desiring to reduce his income might sell stock that had appre-
ciated less than its earnings or purchase stock in a corporation likely
to show a net loss. Another shareholder who realized that his taxable
income is likely to be abnormally low might sell stock that had
depreciated less than its loss or purchase stock in a corporation likely
to have substantial net earnings. Although tax considerations are
likely to continue to have an important impact on decisions whether
to buy or sell securities, tax-motivated trading on the securities mar-
kets should not be unnecessarily increased.
Allocating corporate income or loss to the year-end holder would
also be unfair. The price of stock purchased near the year's end
142. For example, A might have a basis of $100 in his stock at the start of
the year. If later in the year A sold the stock for $125, he would have a gain
of $25 if no corporate income or loss were allocated to him. If $10 of
corporate income were allocated to him, he would have $10 income, his basis
would increase $10 to $110, and his gain would be reduced to $15. His
total income, $10 of allocated corporate income plus $15 gain on the sale of
stock, would be $25, the same as if no income had been allocated to him.
Similarly, if $50 of corporate income were allocated to him, the increase in
basis of his stock would produce a loss of $25 on the sale, so his net income
subject to tax would again be $25. An allocation to A of corporate loss would
reduce his basis, producing an offsetting increase in gain on the sale. With
the proposed elimination of the capital gains preference, both the income or
loss allocated from the corporation and the gain or loss on the sale of stock
would have the same tax treatment.
A restriction on deduction of investment losses such as was discussed in
Part I, supra note 2,- at 330, 385, 394-96, might make it impossible in certain
cases to offset allocated income by loss on the sale of stock. That restriction
should not apply to a loss which only offsets income allocated from the stock
whose sale produced the loss.
143. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 69-73
(1977).
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probably would vary according to the corporation's likely income or
loss.'4 If income were likely to accrue, the shareholder would be
making an interest-free loan of the tax paid on that phantom gain
until the stock was sold. Similarly, if a loss were likely, the share-
holder would be receiving an interest-free loan of the tax saved by
that phantom loss until he sold his stock. Allocating the entire income
or loss to year-end stockholders, then, would result in inequitable
shifting of tax liability.
Allocating no earnings to the year-end holder by allocating all
earnings to the owner at the beginning of the year would be equally
unsatisfactory. Tax-motivated selling problems could be avoided, but
this allocation system would still be unfair for those who purchased
stock early in the year. Earnings of the corporation during the latter
part of the year would not be taxed to anyone that year, and thus
would permit the purchaser of stock to defer taxes on the corporation's
income during the first partial year he held the stock.145 Allocating
all earnings to the person holding the stock at either end of the cor-
poration's tax year therefore would be undesirable because the tax
system either would be recognizing phantom gains and losses or
failing to recognize real ones.
The most appropriate allocation system would be to allocate in-
come according to the amount of time the person owning the stock
at year's end has held the stock.146 If corporate income were relatively
level during the year, such an allocation system should provide rela-
tively little incentive for tax-motivated trading. Difficulties in pre-
dicting corporate income early in the tax year would tend to dis-
courage tax-motivated trading. Because the stockowner would be
allocated income or loss according to the time he held the stock,
tax-motivated trading would also be discouraged later in the year.
Problems might be presented, however, if the corporation's income
were not uniform throughout the year. For example, the corporation
might have profits during one quarter of the year and a loss the next
quarter; its business might be highly seasonal, such as retailing Christ-
mas trees; or it might have a large non-recurring gain or loss from
144. For example, stock which sold for $100 at the start of the year might
sell for $110 near the end of the year if it appeared that corporate earnings
would be about $10 per share. A person buying the stock near the year's
end in such a case would seem to be buying $10 that the corporation had
already earned, yet he would be taxed as though he had earned the $10 on
his investment. Although his stock at the start of the next year would still
be worth only $110, he would have been taxed on $10 and his basis would
be increased to $120.
145. If the corporation had a net loss, the shareholder would have to defer
a deduction.
146. The allocation could be based on the number of days the stock was
held, or to ease the administrative burden, on the number of months the stock
was held.
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sale of some of its major assets. The non-uniformities in corporate
income could present problems of tax-motivated trading, recognition
of phantom gain or loss, and non-recognition of real gain or loss.
These problems could be reduced by allocating income to quarters
or months but only at the cost of increasing tax disputes. If earnings
were allocated evenly throughout the year rather than entirely at
either end of the year, the magnitude of the distortion problem would
be reduced. In addition, special allocation rules, analogous to the
separate treatment of these transactions on a financial statement,'147
could be developed for large non-recurring gains or losses from a
corporation's sale of some of its major assets. Thus, the problem of
tax distortion would be unavoidable but could be made tolerable.
Comparable problems could arise when a corporation issues or
redeems its own stock. As with sales between individuals, it would
be unnecessary to allocate any income to a shareholder whose stock
had been redeemed. Similarly, income should be allocated throughout
the year to prevent overtaxation of the holders of either newly-issued
stock or the remaining shares in a corporation which had redeemed
much of its stock. Because both the issue price and the redemption
price would likely be influenced by the corporation's earnings that
year, those holding newly-issued or unredeemed shares would probably
benefit from only part of those earnings. Under time allocation, the
corporation's income or loss would be allocated among all shares
outstanding for any part of the year, with shares outstanding for the
entire year counting as one, and those outstanding for only a part
of the year counting as a fraction.14  As with sales, refinements in
the allocation system might be warranted for special circumstances.
For example, an issue of new stock or a redemption of old stock might
make a significant change in the size of a corporation. In those cases,
the corporation's income could be computed separately for the portions
of the year before and after the issue or redemption if the adminis-
trative burden of these computations were not excessive.
In sum, it would only be necessary to allocate corporate income
to year-end shareholders. The amount allocated should be based on
147. See I AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, APB
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES §2012 (1973).
148. For example, a calendar-year corporation might have 1000 shares out-
standing on January 1, and then might issue 200 shares on July 1 and 100
shares on October 1. For allocating that year's income, it would have 1000
full shares, 200 half shares, and 100 quarter shares, for a total of 1125. Its
income or loss for the year would be divided by 1125. The amount thus de-
termined would be allocated to each of the 1000 shares, half that amount to
each of the 200 shares, one quarter of that amount to each of the 100 shares.
The computations would be the same if the corporation had had 1300 shares
outstanding on January 1, and then redeemed 100 on April 1 and 200 on
July 1.
19771
50 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
the time different shares were outstanding and the time a stock-
owner held his share. Mechanisms similar to those now used to
report dividends would be used to report allocated earnings. The
administrative problems of making the allocation would be minor.
More serious administrative problems would arise, however, in allo-
cating corporate income to the shareholder because of revised tax
liability resulting from audits. -
Audits. Under the present tax system a change in the determina-
tion of a corporation's income, whether because of an audit by the IRS
or because of a refund claim, normally will affect only that corpora-
tion's tax liability.14 9 With full integration, however, a change in a
corporation's income would change the tax liability of each share-
holder as well. Moreover, because an audit or refund claim may
take many years, 15 0 many of the individuals whose tax liability is
affected by a corporation's income for a particular year will have
sold their stock long before the matter is finally resolved.
Some of the reforms proposed in this article would decrease
the number of disputes over income. With the distinction between
ordinary income and capital gain eliminated, there would no longer
be disputes concerning the character of particular gains or losses. 15 1
With full integration of the personal and corporate income taxes,
the likelihood of disputes concerning the characterization of pay-
ments as non-deductible dividends or deductible interest or salary
would be significantly reduced. Nevertheless, resolving disputes
under full integration would be burdensome.
The administrative burdens created by audits could be eased at
the cost of causing some inaccuracy in the system. If the results of
the audit were allocated to those who held stock in the year of the
dispute, procedures and exemptions could be developed to reduce the
burdens of taxing them when the dispute is ultimately resolved.
Alternatively, the change in income could be attributed to those
holding stock in the year the dispute is resolved rather than to those
who held stock in the year of the dispute.
Changes in tax liability resulting from audits and refund claims
could be allocated effectively and efficiently to those who held stock
in the dispute year only by implementing a variety of procedures.
Principally, a final determination of corporate income in one admini-
149. Because under the present tax system dividends are taxable to share-
holders only if the corporation has historic or current earnings and profits, see
note 50 supra, a change in the corporation's income may change the tax
treatment of shareholders' dividends.
150. See, e.g., Stanton v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 287 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1961) (involving tax years 1942-43).
151. See Part I, supra note 2, at 331-32.
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strative forum,15 2 followed by litigation in one judicial forum 153
would be required. The corporation would control this administra-
tive and judicial proceeding. Shareholders, however, would be en-
titled to notice of the proceedings 154 and permitted to intervene.
A single determination of the tax liability of the corporation and its
shareholders could be accomplished by adopting the procedures de-
veloped in state and federal courts for handling large class actions
and shareholder derivative suits. 15 5 Changes in the shareholders'
liability arising from changes in allocated corporate income could
be distinguished from other tax disputes. Other disputes would still
be subject to normal audit procedures in the IRS district of the tax-
payer's residence. These disputes could be foreclosed by the statute
of limitations even though litigation proceeded in regard to the
amount of corporate income. Thus the effects of corporate audits
would not substantially impair the dispute process in other areas.
Once corporate income had been finally determined, the change in
the individual's tax liability would be a simple matter of computa-
tions, which could be performed by the IRS.
Former stockholders would complicate the process of deter-
mining tax liability in a single adjudication. The corporate officers
might not adequately represent the interests of former shareholders,
especially if most of the corporation's stock had since changed hands.
In such a case, former shareholders would be more likely to inter-
vene and might replace the corporate officers as lead representatives
in the controversy. Finally, because regular corporate channels
could not be used, the costs of notifying former shareholders who
152. Presumably the administrative forum would be before the IRS director
of the district in which the corporation had its principal place of business or
office. Section 6091(b)(2).
153. Currently, a taxpayer may elect not to pay the deficiency and litigate
in the Tax Court, Section 6213, or to pay the deficiency and litigate in the
appropriate federal district court, or in the Court of Claims. Section 7422.
Actions in the district courts are subject to the venue restrictions of 28 U.S.C.
§1402(a) (1970), and review of tax court decisions in the courts of appeals
is subject to the venue restrictions of Section 7482(b). If taxpayers are to
continue to have a choice of three judicial forums in which to litigate, that
choice should be made so that the question of a corporation's income will be
determined in one court. The shareholders might be allowed individually to
elect whether to pay the deficiency before litigating.
154. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
155. See 7-7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§§ 1751-1803 (1972).
A determination of corporate income would be easier to manage than a large
class action. Because the corporate officers could usually be expected to ade-
quately represent the interests of their shareholders, the problems of choosing a
representative and determining the adequacy of representation would be fewer
than in a class action. Notice could be included in regular communications from
the corporation at considerably less expense than if mailed separately. Similarly,
identifying members of the class would be much less difficult than in a class action
because both the corporation and the IRS would have records of the shareholders.
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had sold all their stock in the corporation would be greater than
the costs of notifying current shareholders." 6
The problems created by former shareholders could be eased
by exempting them from deficiency assessments if the corporate in-
come attributable to the shares they once held was less than a small
amount, perhaps $100.157 The tax on such small amounts would not
justify the administrative burdens involved in collecting it. Reve-
nues would not be increased by the amount of the tax in any case.
Had the taxpayer reported that income, his basis in his stock would
be increased, thus decreasing the gain or increasing the loss recog-
nized on sale 158 and decreasing the taxes owed for the year of
sale. The net effect would depend on the former shareholder's
tax bracket in the dispute and the sale years, the time span between
those years, and the interest rate.159 Because the revenue increase
for the income dispute year would be offset to some extent by a
revenue decrease for the stock sale year, the de minimus exemption
for former shareholders might be fairly large, perhaps even $1000.
The exemption for former shareholders could also be time-based.
If the taxpayer were in the same tax bracket in both the dispute
year and the sale year-a fairly realistic assumption over short
periods with generous averaging provisions 1 0 -the only increase in
revenue would be interest accrued between the sale year and the
dispute year. Over short periods the accrued interest might not
warrant the administrative problems of collection. Thus, those who
sold their stock within the first few years after the income dispute
year might be entitled to an even larger exemption. With the exemp-
tion based on both the amount of income and the time between the
dispute year and the sale year, the problems created by former share-
holders could be substantially reduced without endangering revenues.
Allocating the results of the litigation to the stockowners in the
resolution year,16' however, poses a number of substantial problems.
Corporate income would be taxed in the wrong year. Income earned
156. These additional costs of notice should initially be borne by the IRS,
at least where it is asserting a deficiency.
157. A similar exception might also be provided for continuing shareholders.
158. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
159. If the shareholder were in a low tax bracket in the dispute year and
in a high tax bracket when he sold the stock, the determination of an increase
in the corporation's income for the dispute year could entitle the former
shareholder to a net refund.
160. See Part I, supra note 2, at 362-66. Also, tax rates have been stable.
Although there has been some adjustment in the brackets, the tax rates of 14%
to 70% provided in Section 1 have been in effect since 1965.
161. See DEP'T oF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsic TAx REFORM 74
(1977). For example, an audit of a corporation's 1978 income might be re-
solved in 1980 by increasing the corporation's reported income by $100,000.
Under this secondapproach that $100,000 would be allocated to those holding
stock in 1980 rather than to those who held stock in 1978.
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but not reported in one year would not be taxed until the dispute
was resolved, possibly many years later, posing severe deferral prob-
lems. 1' 2 Because the income would be treated as earned in the year
in which the dispute was resolved, charging interest would not mini-
mize the advantages of deferral. 1 63  Corporate income would also
be attributed to the wrong taxpayer if the stock were traded between
the dispute year and the resolution year. The person holding the
stock when the dispute is resolved would be taxed on that income
even though his purchase price presumably reflected the benefit of
that earlier-earned income. The person who held the stock in the
dispute year would already effectively have been taxed on the dis-
puted income when he sold his stock. That is, had the income
been reported, it would have increased his basis in the stock, thereby
decreasing the gain or increasing the loss he would recognize on
sale of the stock. In effect, both the prior holder and the present
holder would be taxed on the same income. Even though the mar-
ket might adjust for this problem,1 64 this inaccurate allocation might
disrupt securities markets. Prospective buyers might be reluctant to
purchase stock in a corporation involved in a dispute over a rela-
tively large amount of income. These disruptions could also cause
corporate managers to settle disputes on terms favorable to the IRS.
Because the claim would involve the personal liability of the share-
holder rather than just a claim against the corporation's assets, the
disruption of the securities market might be even greater with full
integration than under the present system. On balance, it would be
better to allocate the audit results to stockholders in the dispute
year rather than in the resolution year. The complexity of the first
approach, eased by the suggested exemptions, is preferable to the
problems under the second approach of taxing income at the wrong
time and perhaps to the wrong taxpayer, and possibly disrupting
securities markets. Either approach, however, is feasible.
Complex Corporate Ownership Structures. The discussion thus
far has been in terms of a corporation having a capital structure con-
162. See Part I, supra note 2, at 326-27, 366.
163. The effect of charging interest could be roughly approximated under
this second approach by increasing the amount of income from the dispute
year by the appropriate interest rate. As long as the shareholder was in the
same tax bracket in both the dispute year and the resolution year, increasing
the allocated income by the interest rate would have the same effect as al-
locating income to the dispute year and charging interest on the increase in
tax liability. The shareholder's basis in his stock, however, would be increased
only by the allocated income, not by the interest charge used to increase that
income. The problem with this rough approximation is that if the audit took
many years the shareholder probably would not be in the same tax bracket once
the averaging period is exceeded.
164. Compare the discussion of differing corporate and shareholder bases in
text accompanying notes 138-40 supra.
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sisting solely of one class of common stock owned by individuals.
Of course the ownership of corporations is often much more complex.
Besides common stock, a corporation may also have various types
of bonds and preferred stock. Moreover, stock frequently will be
owned by corporations rather than individuals, sometimes in inter-
locking patterns: Corporation A owns stock in Corporation B, B owns
stock in C, and C owns stock in A. Full integration must account
for such complexities in corporate ownership.
The classic types of investment in a corporation are bonds, cu-
mulative non-participating preferred stock, 16 and common stock. Cor-
porate managers and investors have also utilized many other types
of investment in corporations-more than can be described in this
article-for various business and tax purposes. The existence of these
different types of investment, however, does not significantly affect
the feasibility of full integration.
As owners of the residual interest in the corporation, holders of
common stock would be liable for taxes on the residual income under
full integration. The tax system must determine the proper tax treat-
ment of the holders of superior investment, such as bonds and pre-
ferred stock, in order to determine residual income.
With the elimination of the double taxation of earnings on equity
investments under full integration, a major source of debt versus
equity disputes would disappear.160 Disputes could still arise because
of differences in the tax treatment of debt and equity in regard to
timing and inflation correction. Although earnings on equity under
full integration would be taxed currently, whether or not distributed,
a bondholder using cash accounting would be taxed only when interest
was paid or payable and not when it was earned. Yet, if the cor-
poration used accrual accounting, it would have deducted accrued
but unpaid interest from the income to be allocated to shareholders.
Thus, this interest would not be taxed currently to anyone. The po-
tential advantages of deferral for bondholders could be substantial.' 67
165. Preferred stock normally is entitled to receive a specified dividend
before any dividends are paid on common stock. If preferred is cumulative,
it is entitled to receive the specified dividend not only for the current year
but also for all prior years before any dividends are paid on common. Cumula-
tive preferred normally has a liquidation preference or redemption price equal
to its issue price plus accrued but unpaid dividends. If preferred is partici-
pating, it is entitled not only to the specified dividend but also to share in
any dividends declared on common. For example, after the specified dividend
is paid on participating preferred, those shares might be entitled to half the
dividend paid on common or, after a certain dividend on common, to share
equally with common in any* further dividends. The most frequently used
type of preferred is cumulative non-participating. See CAVTCH, TAX PLANNING
FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.02[2] (1974).
166. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
167. Section 267 prevents deductions from accruing for amounts owed to a
related person who does not have to report them as income.
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The advantage of deferral could be restricted by denying the cor-
poration an interest deduction until the bondholder reported the in-
terest income.16s The bondholder could still obtain the advantage
of deferral, but the income of equity holders would be artificially
increased. The expected resistance from equity holders would tend
to restrict the deferral advantages to bondholders. A more complete
solution, however, would be to treat all corporate bonds like original
issue discount bonds. Section 1232 makes both the corporation and
the bondholder accrual basis taxpayers. Although interest is not
paid until the bond is redeemed, accrued interest is currently de-
ducted by the corporation and taxed to the bondholder. 1'' Under
this approach, holders of both bonds and equity would be taxed
currently on earnings, whether or not distributed. Thus, an addi-
tional incentive to attempt disguising equity as debt would be avoided.
Under full integration inflation corrections for debt and equity
income would also be different. Inflation corrections would be made
currently for debt. Interest would be reduced by the inflation rate
to determine both the bondholder's income and the 'corporation's
deduction.7 0 The principal amount of the bond, however, would not
be corrected for inflation. The inflation correction for equity would
operate differently. Although the corporation would adjust such
items as depreciation and gain on the sale of property,' 7 ' there would
be no current correction for inflation for the corporation's continuing
assets or for income allocated to the shareholders. Inflation correction,
therefore, would be deferred until a sale.172 This difference in infla-
tion correction reflects real differences in economic rights. The holder
of debt has a claim only to a specified number of dollars of income
168. Cf. Section 83(h) (employer's deduction for certain types of salary pay-
ments is delayed until the employee reports the salary income).
169. A provision might be made to prevent the accrual of interest for tax
purposes on bonds of insolvent corporations. As the corporation became solvent,
past due interest would be accrued by both the corporation and the bondholder.
170. See Part I, supra note 2, at 346-52.
171. Id. at 337-46.
172. For example, A and B might form a corporation, A contributing $10,000
cash for all the stock, B contributing $10,000 cash for 9% bonds. In each
of its first two years, the corporation might have inflation-corrected income
before deducting interest of $2,000. If the inflation rate were 6%, the corpora-
tion's payment of $900 interest to B would be treated as a payment of only
$300 in computing B's income and the corporation's deduction. Thus A's
income would be $1,700 each year. If the corporation were liquidated at the
end of the second year, B would receive his $10,000 tax-free as a return of his
investment. A's basis would have been increased by two years of 6% inflation
to $11,236. The $1,700 of earnings allocated for the first year would increase,
A's basis by $1,802 when corrected for inflation. Adding the $1,700 for the
second year, A's corrected adjusted basis would be $11,236 + $1,802 4- $1,700 =
$14,738. He would recognize as a gain or a loss the difference between this
amount and the amount realized when the cororation was liquidated. Had A
been able to correct his income for inflation, he would have had only $1,100
income the first year and $1,034 the second, and an adjusted basis of $12,134.
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and to a specified number of dollars as a return of his investment.
Thus, this claim can be eroded by inflation. The holder of equity,
however, has a claim to the remainder of the corporate income and
assets. His claim is dependent on the value of the business and
the business' assets rather than fixed in dollar terms. Because the
assets of a corporation are likely to appreciate in an inflationary
period, the shareholder's interest is less likely to be diminished by
inflation. 173 Therefore, current correction for inflation is unnecessary
for equity holders.
For several reasons, disputes between taxpayers and the IRS as
to the characterization of particular investments in corporations would
not be likely to occur frequently as a result of the different means
of inflation correction. First, the difference in inflation correction
relates only to timing. Second, debt may be held pro rata with equity.
Investors in such cases would obtain little tax benefit by making part
of their investments in debt and part in equity. A current inflation
correction, which would reduce interest income, would also reduce
the corporation's interest deduction, and thus increase the amount
of corporate income to be allocated to equity. Finally, even where
debt and equity were not held pro rata, the conflicting tax and eco-
nomic interests of debt and equity holders should tend to prevent
abuses. Although disputes over the characterization of an investment
as debt or equity will continue for corporate law purposes, the tax
system proposed here should be close enough to real economic in-
terests to encourage few additional disputes.
Cumulative non-participating preferred stock represents an eco-
nomic investment more like bonds than common stock. Like debt,
such preferred stock is limited in the amount it will produce either
as return on investment or as return of investment. Also, the holders
of preferred stock have a claim to the corporation's income and assets
which is superior to that of the holders of common stock. Accord-
ingly, the tax system should treat this preferred stock like debt. 174
Dividends on this preferred stock could be treated on an accrual basis
both for the corporation's deduction and for inclusion in the stock-
holder's income.175 The inflation correction could be made currently
173. One cannot precisely predict how inflation will affect the value of
businesses or their assets, but it is reasonable to assume that they, like every-
thing else in the economy, will appreciate at the inflation rate. Only if business
assets would not appreciate at all in a period of inflation would it be appropriate
to correct equity income for inflation in the manner outlined in the text ac-
companying note 170.
174. Others have suggested that dividends on preferred stock should be de-
ductible under the present tax system. See, e.g., D. SMiTr, Tax Treatment of
Dividends, in 3 TAX REvisioN COMPENDrUM 1543, 1545-46 (House Ways &
Means Comm. 1959).
175. If a corporation's capital were impaired so that it could not pay divi-
dends, accrual of dividends on preferred wodd end for purposes of both
FEDERAL INCOME TAX REFORM
as it would be for bonds. Thus the three classic types of investments
in corporations would become two for tax purposes. Bonds and
cumulative non-participating preferred would both be treated on an
accrual basis and would be currently corrected for inflation.
Corporations also provide for other forms of investment. If non-
participating preferred stock is not cumulative, its dividends would
be recognized for tax purposes by the corporation and shareholder
only when paid. Current inflation correction might be appropriate.
If preferred stock is participating, it resembles a hybrid of classic
preferred and common stock. For tax purposes, it should be treated
as a combination of the two. When the stock is issued, the basis
should be allocated between the preferred and the common com-
ponents according to their respective fair market values.1 76 There-
after, each component could be treated as though it were an inde-
pendent security. The preferred component would be taxed like
cumulative non-participating preferred stock. Gain would be allo-
cated to the common component to the extent that it would partici-
pate in a dividend. For example, if preferred would receive half the
dividend on common, each preferred share would count as a half
share in allocating the corporation's earnings.177  Losses would be
allocated as the latest retained earnings were. When there are no
retained earnings, losses should be allocated in accordance with whose
liquidation rights are being impaired.178
corporate deduction and inclusion in shareholder income. As the capital be-
came unimpaired, past dividends would be accrued. See note 169 supra.
176. Compare Section 1232(b)(2) which provides a similar allocation when
an original issue discount bond is issued as part of an investment unit which
includes other securities. For existing stock the allocation would be based on
fair market values on the effective date of full integration.
177. The matter would be more complex if preferred participated only after
a specified dividend on common. For example, a distribution might be paid
first to preferred $1 per share then to common $1 per share, then to both in
a prescribed ratio. If the specified dividend on common were cumulative, earn-
ings per share up to that dividend would be allocated to common and ad-
ditional earnings would be allocated between preferred and common in the
prescribed ratio. If the specified dividend on common were non-cumulative, it
would be uncertain who would benefit from retained earnings. The issuance
of only one large dividend over a several year period would result in only one
specified dividend on common, but annual dividends would produce several
specified dividends on common. Preferred would participate in retained earn-
ings only in excess of the specified common dividends. This uncertainty should
be resolved against those in control. When common shareholders have voting
control, earnings up to their specified dividend should be allocated to them
whether or not the dividend is paid. If preferred shareholders have voting
control, earnings up to the specified dividend should be allocated to common
only if the dividend is paid.
178. For example, if the participating preferred had a liquidation preference
based on their full issue price, losses in excess of retained earnings would be
allocated first to common. But if that liquidation preference were based only
on the preferred component, losses would be allocated between participating
preferred and common stock. The deduction for losses would reduce the basis
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Problems could arise in accomodating participating preferred in
a tax system because the economic rights involved are. uncertain.
Most of the complexities could be avoided, however, if the corporation
currently paid the specified dividends on preferred and common.
Conversion privileges and warrants are often used to create new
types of investment in a corporation. A conversion privilege enables
a holder of one type of investment to convert it into another type.
For example, a bond might be convertible into preferred or common
stock, or preferred stock might be convertible into common. A war-
rant is an option to have the corporation issue a particular type of
investment at a prescribed price. Warrants are normally issued in
conjunction with another type of investment. The purpose of both
conversion privileges and warrants is to create a type of investment
which includes both a senior security for protection against loss and
the possibility of greater participation in corporate profits by exercising
the conversion privilege or warrant.
The exercise of a conversion privilege or warrant poses some
problems under full integration because it is likely to change the
beneficiary of these retained earnings. The solution would be to
make the exercise of such rights a taxable event.179 The holder
should be taxed on the amount by which the tax book value of his
new investment exceeded his basis in the converted security or war-
rant. The existing holders of the type of investment acquired by
exercise of the privilege or warrant should be allowed a deduction for
the dilution of the tax book value allocable to their shares, to the
extent that the diluted allocation is less than their respective adjusted
bases in their stock.
The classic types of investment in corporations-bonds, non-parti-
cipating cumulative preferred stock, and common stock-could be eas-
ily accomodated by full integration. The accomodation of other types
of investment would be more complicated but still manageable. 80
of the holder of participating preferred stock in its common component. When
that basis is eliminated no further losses would be deductible until the losses
had eliminated capital attributable to the common stock. Then losses would
be allocated to the preferred component of the participating preferred.
179. At present the exercise of such rights is normally not a taxable event to
either the holder or the corporation. See G. C. M.-1836, 1937-1 C. B. 101,
Rev. Rul. 70-521, 1970-2 C. B. 72. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note
6, at § 4.06.
180. A variety of other factors may be used to create different types of
investment in corporations: voting rights, subordination of claims, etc. Such
factors, while important economically, would be relevant for tax purposes only
to the extent that they affect who would benefit from corporate earnings or be
hurt by corporate losses. Voting, for example, would seem to have no such
affect, while subordination might. The tax treatment of types of investment
which contain factors having such effects should be along the lines discussed
in text accompanying notes 174-79 supra.
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Another complicating factor is the ownership of stock by cor-
porations rather than by individuals. If Corporation A owns stock in
Corporation B, B's earnings will be allocated to A, and A's earnings
(including its share of B's earnings) will be allocated to A's share-
holders. The allocation process becomes even more difficult if B also
owns stock in A: B's earnings should include a portion of A's earnings,
but A's earnings cannot be determined until B's are, and vice versa.
The complexity increases geometrically as more corporations become
involved. One solution to the A-owns-B-owns-A problem would be to
have A and B each compute their earnings without regard to their
holdings of the other's stock, then recompute earnings by including
earnings attributable to holdings of the other's stock. Theoretically,
this process could be repeated indefinitely but the process could be
arbitrarily stopped after one or two rounds. Alternatively, the prob-
lem could be resolved by resorting to mathematical formulas.181
By including corporate income in a shareholder's income much as
partnership income is included in a partner's income,18 2 the problem
of interlocking computations could arise only when both or all cor-
porations have the same ta.able year. Even there it could be avoided
at a cost of some deferral by including corporate items in shareholder
income the day after the corporation's taxable year ends. Thus a
variety of techniques are available to avoid problems arising from
interlocking stock ownership.
181. For instance, assume that Corporation A owns X% of Corporation B and.
Corporation B owns Y% of Corporation A. The formula for determining Cor-
poration A's total earnings could be expressed accordingly:
A's Total Earnings = A Earnings + X% of B's Total Earnings
- A Earnings + X% (B earnings + Y%
of A's total earnings)
= A earnings + X% B earnings
1 -(X%) (Y%)
With more corporations, the equations would become more elaborate. For
example, if A owned X% of B and R% of C, B owns Y% of C and S% of A, and
C owns Z% of A and T% of B, the equation for A's Total Earnings would be:
A Earn (1-TY%) + B Earn (X% + RT%) + C Earn (R% + XY%)
A Total Earn =
1 -YT% -X%S% -R%Z% -XYZ% -RST%
In considering these equations, one should remember that multiplying a number
closer to 0 than to 1 by another such number produces a number much nearer
to 0. For example, 10556 x 10% = 1%, 1% x 1% = 0.01%, etc. Thus if the various
percentages of stock ownership are small, perhaps less than 5% or 10%, these
equations could be simplified without a great loss in accuracy by dropping out
all terms which multiply one percentage holding by another. If that were done,
the equation at the end of the first paragraph would become A Total Earn =
A Earn + X% B Earn, and the equation at the end of the second paragraph
would become A Total Earn = A Earn + X% B Earn + R% C Earn.
182. Partnership items are included in the partner's income in his taxable year
with which the partnership's taxable year ends. Section 706(a).
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Transition
The transition from the present system to a system of full integra-
tion would be likely to cause two types of problems. The burden of
the old tax might have been capitalized so that the change would
produce windfall gains or losses. Mechanical problems of how best
to effect the transition must also be considered.
It is sometimes said that an old tax is a good tax. That is, an
old tax is good, even though it is inequitable and inefficient because
the market has adjusted to it. For example, the oil depletion
allowance, a provision reducing the tax on income from oil and gas
wells, was long a target of tax reformers.1 3 Regardless of the merits
of the oil depletion allowance, the market had adjusted to it. When
a person purchased an oil well, he also bought the tax benefits of the
oil depletion allowance.8 4 When the allowance was limited, however,
these purchasers of oil wells were injured because the price they had
paid included the value of that allowance. The double taxation of
corporate earnings is the mirror image of the depletion allowance.
Much as the price of oil wells would increase to reflect the tax bene-
fit of the depletion allowance, the price of stock would decrease to
reflect the burden of double taxation. Thus, stock purchasers are not
affected by double taxation because they have paid a price which
reflects these tax provisions. The elimination of double taxation would
result in windfall gains to existing stock owners. The reluctance to
bestow these windfall gains makes a reluctance to reform the present
system more understandable.
That the market has adjusted to a tax, however, does not mean
that the tax does not continue to produce adverse effects. Market
forces creating an equal after-tax rate of return for all investments
distort the allocation of economic resources. If oil wells benefit from
the depletion allowance, more money will be used to drill oil wells.
Similarly, if stock is burdened by double taxation, less money will be
invested in corporate equity. The over-investment in tax-benefitted
areas and the under-investment in tax burdened areas will result in
a less productive economy.
The market's adjustment to a tax benefit or penalty, moreover,
may not eliminate its effects for all taxpayers. Even though the
market will charge everyone the same price and the market clearing
price will eliminate the benefit or penalty for investors in one tax
bracket, its effects may continue for those in higher or lower tax
183. See, e.g., Baker & Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence,
64 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1951). The oil depletion allowance is now restricted by
Section 613A.
184. This is only one of the possible market adjustments to the oil depletion
allowance. Other possible adjustments would include a decrease in the price of
oil and an increase in the price of oil drilling rigs.
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brackets. 185 Thus market adjustment may not eliminate problems of
taxpayer inequity created by a tax benefit or penalty.
The possibility of market adjustment to the present system of
taxing corporations and shareholders should not militate against
changing that system because it is unclear how the adjustment has
been made, and in any case, the adjustment appears to be slight.
Imposing taxes at both the corporate and shareholder levels may
produce overtaxation, which would depress stock prices, so that a
change would produce windfall gains. The revenue loss attributable
to taxable shareholders under full integration would only be about $8
billion,'86 suggesting that there is relatively little overtaxation of cor-
porate earnings. Shifting the corporate income tax would further
reduce the extent of overtaxation. Shifting, deferral, and capital gains
may even result in undertaxation for those in higher brackets.18 7
Accordingly, stock prices may have increased so that a change would
produce windfall losses. Thus, market adjustment is not a persuasive
argument against reforming the present system. The difficulty of
discerning the direction and degree of market adjustment further
suggests that a change to a system of full integration should not
attempt to undo these market adjustments.
In many ways, corporate tax attributes would be the same under
full integration as under the present system. For example, although
basis would be subject to inflation correction, the corporation would
retain the same basis in its assets and shareholders would retain the
same basis in their stock. The treatment of corporate distributions
would differ, however, under full integration. Under the present sys-
tem distributions are taxable to shareholders to the extent the corpo-
ration has earnings and profits; under full integration distributions
would be tax free. Therefore, at least initially, distributions of pre-
integration and post-integration earnings should be distinguished.
Because post-integration earnings would already have been taxed to
the shareholders, those earnings should be distributed tax-free. Pre-
integration earnings, however, would not have been taxed at the
shareholder level and therefore should be taxed when distributed.
Moreover, if pre-integration earnings were not taxed if distributed
after the implementation of full integration, corporate distributions
would be discouraged in the period immediately preceding full
integration.
A method of determining whether a distribution is pre-integration
or post-integration is necessary if the two are to be distinguished.
Distributions could be treated in any of three ways: (1) as distribu-
tions first from pre-integration earnings and then from post-integra-
185. See note 44 supra.
186. See note 115 supra.
187. See text accompanying notes 37, 44 supra.
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tion earnings, (2) as distributions first from post-integration earnings
and then from pre-integration earnings, or (3) as distributions in part
from each. The benefits of tax deferral would be minimized if dis-
tributions are treated as if paid first from pre-integration earnings.
In addition, past earnings and profits would be eliminated most
quickly this way. Shareholders would be taxed on both these dis-
tributions and allocated current earnings. But taxing a shareholder
on two sets of earnings when he only receives distributions on one
set of earnings is unfair and may aggravate existing problems in the
system. Furthermore, this solution would impose on all corporations
the heavy burden of computing earnings and profits.'8 8
A simpler solution would be to treat dividends as paid first from
post-integration earnings and then from pre-integration earnings. Com-
puting pre-integration earnings and profits would be necessary only
if dividends exceeded post-integration earnings. Deferral advantages
would be available for pre-integration earnings and profits, but no
more than are presently available. Moreover, much of those earlier
earnings and profits could be from a period when other persons owned
the stock.18 9
Distributions could also be allocated proportionately between pre-
integration and post-integration earnings. For example, if a corpora-
tion has earnings of both types, distributions could be. treated as half
from each. This approach would reduce the benefits of deferral. No
cash flow problems would be created if the combination of the post-
integration and the after-tax part of the pre-integration portion of the
distribution exceeded the shareholder's tax liability on the corporate
earnings allocated to him. Finally, by providing that after five or
ten years, distributions of pre-integration earnings would no longer
be taxable, the need for precise computation of pre-integration earn-
ings and profits could be reduced.
Another difference between full integration and the present sys-
tem is that under full integration when appreciation in stock values
is realized the gain would be adjusted for inflation and then taxed as
ordinary income, whereas under the present system it would normally
be taxed at capital gains rates without adjustment for inflation. Be-
cause of the complexity in allocating appreciation between pre-reform
and post-reform periods, these reforms should be applied to apprecia-
tion existing at the time the reforms are implemented. Although reli-
ance on the capital gains benefit would be frustrated, the unexpected
benefit of an inflation correction would offer some compensation.
The transition to full integration should not present serious prob-
lems. Little market adjustment to the present system appears to have
188. See note 50 supra.
189. See note 16 supra.
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occurred, so the transition is unlikely to produce significant windfall
gains or losses. Dividends from corporations which have earnings
from both before and after the transition can be treated either as paid
first from post-integration earnings and then from pre-integration
earnings, or as in part from both. In either case, a few years after
the transition all dividends might be made non-taxable. Appreciation
which occurred before the transition should be taxed like subsequent
appreciation. Thus, full integration could be practically implemented.
CONCLUSION
Full integration of the personal and corporate income taxes would
eliminate both the double corporate taxation argument for capital
gains and the complexity, inequity, and distortion in the present system
of taxing corporations and shareholders. Full integration could be
achieved without excessive administrative burdens. With implementa-
tion of full integration and the reforms proposed in Part I, the major
justifications for the capital gains preference would disappear. The
capital gains preference could then be eliminated.
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